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Chapter 2: Labor Law and Employment Regulation: Neoclassical and 
Institutional Perspectives 
 
Bruce E. Kaufman 
 
Abstract: This paper provides an in-depth economic analysis of the pros and cons of labor 
law and employment regulation. Two ―law and economics‖ movements are identified in the 
USA: the first is the well-known post-World War II law and economics movement centered 
in neoclassical economics and the University of Chicago; the second is the largely 
unknown and neglected pre-World II law and economics movement centered in 
institutional economics and the University of Wisconsin. The former mostly provides the 
―con‖ side to employment regulation, the latter mostly provides the ―pro‖ side. The paper 
describes the assumptions, methods and theories of each school of thought and their 
implications regarding the optimal form and extent of labor law and employment 
regulation.   
 
Legal regulation of the employment relationship expanded greatly over the twentieth 
century in all the industrializing countries of the world. A century ago in Anglo- Saxon 
countries the legal relationship between employer and employee was regulated by the 
common law doctrine of ―master and servant‖ (Linder 1989; Deakin and Wilkinson 2005). 
Rights and protections afforded employees under this doctrine were few, while statute law 
provisions reregulating the terms and conditions of employment were relatively elementary 
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in Europe and Australasia and practically non-existent in the United States (Rodgers 1998). 
As a practical matter, the employment relationship was largely regarded as simply another 
species of commercial transaction between buyer and seller and, thus, was governed by the 
same generic body of contract law (Epstein 1983). Not surprisingly, a separate field of 
labor and employment law had yet to emerge in most countries of that era (Arthurs 2002; 
Birk 2002; Davies and Freedland 2002).  
What a difference a century makes! From then to now have been added dozens of 
new employment laws and regulatory agencies governing all aspects of labor and 
employment. The United States, for example, did not have so much as a federal child labor 
law until 1938; six decades later the Dunlop Commission spoke of ―an explosion in the 
breadth and depth of legal regulation of the American workplace,‖ including twenty-six 
major statutes, one executive order, and thousands of detailed regulations (Commission of 
the Future of Worker-Management Relations 1994, p. 125). Employment regulation has 
also grown apace in other countries and, indeed, in many nations of the European Union 
and Latin America employment regulation considerably exceeds the US level (Blanpain 
1999; Cook 2006). Accompanying the growth of employment regulation has been a similar 
emergence and growth of the subfield of labor and employment law both in law school 
curricula and the world of legal practice. Today in the US almost 30,000 attorneys list their 
area of specialization as labor and employment (Martindale.com); the case law in labor and 
employment is huge in breadth and depth (Summers, Dau-Schmidt and Hyde 2007); and 
the field is served by a number of well-known law reviews and journals.  
A century ago many economists and legal scholars -- representing in the US what 
Hovenkamp (1990) calls the ―first great law and economics movement‖ -- argued that the 
  
4 
 
nation would benefit from greater legal regulation of the employment relationship. They 
also carried their argument into the global arena and made the case for a much expanded 
regime of international labor law, such as was initiated when the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) was created in 1919 (Valticos 1969; Kaufman 2004a). These 
proponents of employment regulation, associated with the Progressive Movement and 
typically drawn from the schools of institutional economics and legal realism, faced 
entrenched intellectual and legal opposition and political roadblocks, yet eventually carried 
the day, starting with the New Deal in the 1930s and moving forward in recurring periods 
of policy activism up to the 1980s. This law and economics movement gave rise to a public 
interest rationale for regulation of the employment relationship that continues to provide a 
large part of the theoretical and ethical core for what may be described as the ―traditional‖ 
approach to labor and employment law. This approach is associated with well-known 
names in the post-World War II fields of labor law and industrial relations in the USA and 
abroad. Early examples include Benjamin Aaron, Marco Biagi, Archibald Cox, John 
Dunlop, Paul Durand, Otto Kahn-Freund and Clyde Summers; well recognized names in 
the contemporary period include Harry Arthurs, Janice Bellace, Roger Blanpain, Samuel 
Estreicher, Mathew Finkin, Bob Hepple, Paul Weiler and Manfred Weiss. The modern-day 
adherents of the first law and economics movement also have many points in common with 
the new program of behavioral law and economics (Sunstein 2000), as well as critical legal 
studies (e.g., Stone 2004).       
Since the early 1980s the pendulum appears to have noticeably swung in a different 
and largely opposite direction on both sides of the Atlantic, although with greater 
receptivity and implementation in the Anglo-Saxon economies (Bernstein 2001; Yergin and 
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Stanislav 2002). Over the last three decades an increasingly large and influential group of 
economists and legal scholars, typically affiliated with what Hovenkamp calls the ―second 
great law and economics movement,‖ has made a persuasive case for substantial labor 
market de-regulation – even to the point of returning to the common law regime that 
existed a century ago (e.g., Epstein 1984). The core group among these scholars are 
American and draw inspiration from the neoclassical school of economics, particularly the 
Chicago School version made famous by Becker, Friedman and Stigler (van Overveldt 
2007; Kaufman 2008a). The best known and most influential names include Robert Bork, 
Ronald Coase (with caveats noted below), Richard Epstein, Daniel Fischel, Edmund Kitch, 
William Landes and Richard Posner. Another related intellectual movement, often called 
―New Institutional Economics‖ (NIE), has also in important ways complemented the 
conservative Chicago School version of law and economics, as illustrated by the work of 
people such as Harold Demsetz, Michael Wachter and Oliver Williamson (Dow 1997; 
Furbotn and Richter 1997). In the world of policy-making, we see evidence of this U-turn 
in the rise to influence of neo-liberalism and the mounting pressure on governments from 
globalization and other forces to loosen their regulatory regimes in order to promote greater 
economic competitiveness, labor market flexibility, and job growth (Deakin and Wilkinson 
2005; Prasad 2006). Not surprisingly, the field of labor and employment law has also lost 
considerable luster and one now reads articles in law reviews about the ―death of labor law‖ 
(e.g., Hepple 1996; Estlund 2006).  
The remainder of this volume is devoted to a detailed exploration of the pros, cons 
and consequences of the many different types of modern labor and employment regulation. 
Much of this analysis, in both its positive and normative aspects, will in some way build on 
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or call upon the theoretical issues and points of view contained in the two law and 
economics (L&E) movements birthed in the United States during the twentieth century. It 
seems useful, therefore, to provide here an exposition and review of these two opposing 
schools of analysis, with the idea that this provides a foundation and common reference 
point for the chapters that follow. Of more general interest, I am not aware that a similar 
comparative study of the two L&E movements has been previously provided; indeed, to 
significant degree the two sides are like the proverbial ships passing in the night.  
The modern L&E movement is examined in the first part of the chapter; the second 
part describes the original L&E movement. The discussion largely draws on a North 
American legal context and literature, although effort is made to selectively bring in 
important European contributions and perspectives. My representation of each paradigm is 
necessarily a stylized generalization; my claim, nonetheless, is that these generalizations 
reasonably capture the core features and propositions of both L&E movements. Finally, for 
ease of exposition, I use the terms labor law and employment regulation as equivalent 
concepts and both are defined in a broad and generic sense to cover all common law, 
statute law and regulatory rulings that pertain to individual or collective aspects of 
employment. Particularly in the US, the collective and individual parts of employment 
regulation are often separately distinguished as ―labor law‖ and ―employment law,‖ but 
here I combine them.  
 
Neoclassical law and economics 
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Most economists and legal scholars talk about the law and economics movement in the 
singular, with the idea there is only one (e.g., Miceli 2004). This law and economics 
movement is associated primarily with various Chicago economists and legal scholars, such 
as those mentioned above, and is grounded on traditional neoclassical microeconomics. 
Since the theoretical base of the second L&E movement is neoclassical economics (NE), I 
henceforth refer to it as neoclassical law and economics (NL&E). NL&E is part of a larger 
project of ―economic imperialism‖ in which traditional price theory is extended and applied 
to explain and evaluate various non-market institutions and behaviors, such as the family, 
fertility, crime and drug addiction (Lazear 2000; Van Overtveldt 2007).  
The positive and normative analysis of law is one of the largest and most influential 
applications of economic imperialism. The modern law and economics project has its roots 
at the University of Chicago in the 1940s, through the work of Henry Simons and Aaron 
Director, but didn‘t blossom and take off as a formal movement until the 1970s. NL&E is 
now widely represented in both economics departments and law schools, but the direction 
of intellectual trade – in keeping with the theme of economic imperialism -- remains 
heavily one-way; that is, from economics to law. Attention to labor and employment law 
was initially slow to develop among NL&E scholars, (Campbell 1986), but in the last two 
decades the literature has expanded dramatically (see Schwab 1997; Donahue 2007).  
 
Models and assumptions 
 
The answers NL&E gives on issues of employment regulation are heavily shaped by the 
way it frames the economic problem; the methods, theories and models it uses; and the 
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positive and normative assumptions underlying these theories and models. Here is a 
thumbnail sketch (also see Collins 2001; Deakin and Wilkinson 2000, 2005; Miceli 2004; 
Posner 2007). 
Efficient allocation of scarce resources. NE makes the efficient allocation of 
scarce resources the central economic problem (Schwab 1997). The idea is that resources of 
land (natural resources), capital, and labor are scarce but people‘s wants are largely 
unlimited, hence economies must allocate and use their resources in the most efficient way. 
An efficient (or Pareto optimal) allocation of resources is attained when it is not possible to 
reallocate these resources to make one person better off without at the same time making 
someone else worse off. An efficient allocation puts the economy on its production 
possibility frontier where it produces the maximum attainable amount of goods and 
services, an outcome that has led some in the NL&E literature to translate the goal of 
efficiency into ―wealth maximization‖ (Posner 2007). The pros and cons of employment 
regulation, in turn, are evaluated largely in terms of their effect on efficiency – laws that 
promote efficiency (getting to the production possibility frontier) are positively viewed and 
those that impede efficiency are negatively viewed.  
Efficiency is defined in terms of consumers’ interests. This second point is 
usually left implicit but needs highlight for what follows. Efficiency means the production 
and allocation of goods and services to maximize the welfare of economic agents; before 
this can become operational, however, the theorist must posit who the economic agents are. 
In principle, an economic agent is any human participant in the economy. For purposes of 
welfare and policy analysis, however, the near-universal practice in neoclassical economics 
is to assume that the utility functions society is trying to maximize belong to consumers – 
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that is, the people who are ultimate end users of the final goods and services 
(Campbell,1983). 
The efficiency of competitive markets. If the social goal is efficient production 
and wealth maximization, then what kind of economy is best at attaining this? Neoclassical 
theory claims to show that the most efficient form of economic organization is a free 
market (―Walrasian‖) economy in which all goods and services are traded in perfectly 
competitive markets. This principle is formally embodied in NE‘s First Fundamental 
Welfare theorem, also called the ―Invisible Hand‖ theorem (Micheli 2004, p. 30). The 
Invisible Hand theorem states that the operation of demand and supply in competitive 
markets will, through the forces of individual self-interest and competition, automatically 
and without central guidance (―as if by an invisible hand‖) move the economy to the 
production possibility frontier. A corollary proposition is known as Say‘s Law: that is, the 
operation of demand and supply and flexible prices in a free market competitive economy 
will automatically move the economy toward a point of full resource utilization and, in 
particular, full employment of labor (Kates 1998). Thus, competitive labor markets lead to 
two highly desired end states: efficient allocation and full utilization of labor. Implicit in 
these two end states are two other outcomes that are frequently cited in the recent NL&E 
literature as also highly valued: competitive markets allow a highly flexible and adaptive 
shift of labor resources in response to changing economic conditions, and competitive 
markets minimize cost and maximize productivity of labor. Law is important to achievement 
of all of these results since the perfectly competitive model hinges on fully specified, 
protected, and tradable property rights, as well as a supporting umbrella of fully specified 
and enforced contract and tort law.  
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Fairness, justice and redistribution. The neoclassical perspective is that 
economics is a positive science that can meaningfully theorize about and make 
recommendations on efficiency, with efficiency being an objective property (given people‘s 
preference structure) with a well-defined meaning and measurement. Fairness and justice, 
however, are regarded as inherently subjective and ethical/metaphysical concepts (like 
beauty and charm) that lack a substantive basis and common unit of measurement. 
Neoclassical economics, therefore, does not include fairness or justice within the standard 
corpus of microeconomic theory, nor does NL&E give them an explicit role in evaluating 
the pros and cons of law and regulation.   
It would be incorrect to say, however, that NE and NL&E ignore fairness and 
justice, or lack anything to say about them. NE and NL&E in fact have four implications or 
predictions about fairness. First is that in the canonical Walrasian representation of NE 
achievement of efficiency in production and exchange is independent of fairness in 
distribution; this property is established by the Second Fundamental Welfare Theorem 
which states that in a competitive market system it is possible to achieve an efficient 
outcome regardless of the initial distribution of endowments (Miceli 2004, p. 30). Second, 
if the resulting efficient point on the production possibility frontier does not result in the 
distribution of goods and income society desires, the welfare maximizing solution is to 
redistribute initial endowments through lump sum transfers rather than by any interference 
or regulation of the market process itself or redistribution of goods and incomes after the 
fact (Collins 2001). Third, attempts to achieve fairness or redistribution through legal or 
regulatory means that disturb or constrain the competitive market process lead to an 
efficiency loss, thus implying existence of an efficiency/equity trade-off. Fourth, and 
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finally, under certain interpretations a competitive market system actually leads to a double 
win – not only does such a system maximize efficiency but it also leads to outcomes that 
are fair and equitable. Posner (2007), for example, argues that it is immoral and unjust to 
waste resources in a world of great poverty and want, hence achieving efficiency is at the 
same time achieving a moral good. With regard to labor markets, a strain of thought going 
back to J.B. Clark (1899), principal originator of the marginal productivity theory, is that 
competitive labor markets lead to fair and just wage outcomes since workers are paid (on 
the margin) what they contribute to the value of production --called by Budd (2004) 
―marginal productivity justice.‖ 
Personal freedom, initiative and responsibility.  Another virtue of a competitive 
market system, according to NE proponents, is that it promotes socially desired outcomes 
and behaviors. Chief among these are maximum personal autonomy, freedom and liberty in 
the economic realm of life, and strong incentives encouraging personal initiative in the 
discovery of new and improved methods of wealth production and in shouldering 
responsibility for one‘s economic choices and life success (Epstein and Paul 1985). In this 
regard, NE and NL&E have a strong normative predisposition in favor of individualism 
(Friedman and Friedman 1980). Part of individualism is giving people as much room for 
choice as possible, free from constraint and coercion. A competitive market system is ideal 
because it decentralizes economic power, promotes and protects private property rights and 
use and disposition thereof, and gives people many alternatives with regard to basic life 
decisions, such as where to live, how to earn a living, and what to with one‘s time and 
goods. In this regard, an important principle to be promoted in the NL&E view is freedom 
of contract (Trebilcock 1993).  
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Freedom of contract promotes two valuable ends: first, by promoting trade and 
protecting the gains there from it channels scarce resources to their most productive use 
and, second, the voluntary making of contracts is presumed to enhance the welfare of both 
parties since otherwise one or both would not agree to the contract terms. This latter 
proposition provides a powerful argument against restrictive market regulations since on 
prima facie grounds they appear to block welfare-augmenting trade (Posner 1984).  
 
Application to labor and employment regulation 
 
Having sketched the theoretical foundation of NL&E, I now use it to examine the pros and 
cons of various types of labor and employment regulation. First are the ―cons,‖ as they 
typically come first and are given more emphasis in NL&E (Trebilcock 1993). To proceed, 
I will consider two broad classes of labor and employment regulation. For purposes of 
identification, I refer to the first as labor market regulation and the second as employment 
mandates. Although in practice the two overlap, in theory they are distinct.  
Labor market regulation constrains or supplants in some direct way the operation of 
demand and supply and the coordinating role of flexible wages and thereby directly 
changes the negotiated terms of the labor contract. Examples include a minimum wage law; 
law to encourage collective bargaining as means to raise workers‘ wages; a child labor law; 
or an equal pay law for men and women in the same jobs.  
Employment mandates stipulate that employers (or other third parties) provide or 
upgrade a particular term or condition of employment, either through direct employer 
provision or indirect provision (e.g., by government or unions) funded through taxes and 
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contributions. They may shift either or both the demand and supply curves and thus 
indirectly affect the terms of the labor contact, but the labor market and coordinating role of 
flexible wages are still free to work out an equilibrium outcome. Examples include 
unemployment insurance, paid maternity leave, advance warning of plant closure, and 
equal opportunity in job assignments and promotions. 
Labor market regulation. Two classic forms of market regulation are a minimum 
wage law and collective bargaining through trade unions. The latter regulates markets not 
through law per se, but through the institution of a trade union which the law encourages 
and protects.  
The standard NL&E evaluation of minimum wage laws and trade unions is 
illustrated in Figure 2.1, panel (a) and (b). Panel (a) and (b) represent two closely connected 
competitive labor markets for the same type of labor (Mincer 1976; Kaufman 2007a). 
Absent any impediment, demand and supply yield the same equilibrium wage of W1 in both 
markets. This wage has all the efficiency and fairness attributes discussed above. In panel 
(a) now impose a minimum wage law or use the law to facilitate formation of a labor union, 
while neither is applied to panel (b). Panel (a) is called the ―covered sector,‖ panel (b) the 
―uncovered sector‖ (no minimum wage law, no union). Analytically, the effect on the two 
labor markets of the union or minimum wage is identical, at least as a first order 
approximation.  
{Figure 2.1. NL&E Perspective: Economic Effects of Labor Market Regulation} 
 
In the case of a minimum wage, the law introduces a price floor into the labor market; in 
the case of collective bargaining a monopoly-like cartel is introduced. Both actions lead to 
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a rise in the wage above the market level, such as from W1 to W2 in panel (a). A number of 
adverse things are predicted to happen.  
First, the higher wage leads employers to cut back on their level of employment 
from L1 to L2 (point A to B), implying L1-L2 workers lose their jobs.  
 Second, the higher wage draws into the covered labor market more people who 
want to work, illustrated by the increase in the quantity supplied of labor from L1 to L3 
(point A to C). But since available jobs are now only L1, the covered sector experiences 
disequilibrium and involuntary unemployment of L3-L1 (point C to B).  
Third, although not directly depicted in the diagram, the theory predicts that covered 
firms respond to the higher wage in several other ways that are also economically harmful. 
That is, firms suffer reduced profit margins and in some cases go out of business; they react 
by ―overusing‖ capital in an effort to hold down labor cost by substituting capital for now 
more (artificially) expensive labor; they attempt to shift on to consumers part of the cost of 
the higher wage in the form of higher prices (or shorter hours, longer wait times, lower 
quality, etc.); and they substitute away from lower productivity workers (e.g., 
inexperienced teenagers, unskilled minorities) and toward higher productivity workers 
(e.g., mature women with more stable work histories, white males with more experience or 
education).  
Fourth, some of the unemployed L3-L1 workers may eventually become discouraged 
by lack of jobs in the covered sector and shift their job search to the uncovered sector.
i
 To 
the extent this happens, the labor supply curve in panel (b) shifts rightward and the 
equilibrium wage falls to W3 (point D to F). Where all workers (presumptively of equal 
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productivity) had earlier received equal wages, one group now gets the higher wage of W1 
while another group gets a lower wage of W3.  
Fifth, while it appears that perhaps things net out as some workers gain and others 
lose, in the aggregate the losers dominate. Among the evident losers are covered firms, 
consumers of covered sector goods, the laid-off and unemployed workers, and uncovered 
workers who now work at a lower wage. The major winner is the group of covered sector 
workers who keep their jobs and now get higher pay. In effect, the former groups have been 
―taxed‖ in order to redistribute income to the latter group. But there is another group that is 
also a loser, and this is a very large group that in fact includes everyone in the country. That 
is, all groups lose because the artificial increase in the wage leads to a general misallocation 
of resources and thus generates economic inefficiency. The fundamental NL&E indictment 
of a minimum wage or trade union, therefore, is that by interfering with free market forces 
they cause society to move inside the production possibility frontier, thus imposing a 
―deadweight loss‖ of wealth on all members of society (Hirsch and Addison 1986). Not 
only is this outcome welfare-reducing, the idea that the government would deliberately 
foster monopoly and protectionism in labor markets seems perverse when it promotes anti-
trust and free trade in product markets (Posner 1984; Baird 2000).  
Sixth, other second order and ―ripple‖ effects from a market intervention such as a 
minimum wage law and collective bargaining may impose additional economic and non-
economic burdens. Examples include rigid wages (reducing the flexibility of the economy; 
preventing return to macroeconomic full employment), less firm-provided training, greater 
inequality of earnings among the workforce, more strikes and restrictive work rules, more 
criminal and underground economy activity (due to the greater number of unemployed), 
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greater political pressure for all kinds of economic protectionism; and a greater division of 
society into fortunate ―insiders‖ and unfortunate ―outsiders.‖    
Seventh, NL&E points out that not only do these legal interventions in labor 
markets create and shift significant costs on to other groups in order to benefit a favored 
group, the great irony is that even the favored group may in the end be a loser (Rottenberg 
1981; Booth,1995). This outcome can be seen as a particular case of the ―law of unintended 
consequences.‖ Thus, the social goal of a minimum wage law or trade union is to 
redistribute income to a particular group of workers. But what actually happens? If firms‘ 
labor demand is elastic (i.e., the quantity demanded of labor falls more than proportionately 
in response to an increase in the price of labor, as it might for teenagers or the unskilled), 
then a rise in the wage causes sufficient people to lose their jobs that the total amount of 
labor income (the ―wage bill‖) earned by the workers is actually less than before. So, say 
the NL&E critics, the unintended but often real effect is to try to solve poverty and low 
earnings by creating more unemployed workers!  
Employment mandates. Legal mandates upon employers have multiplied in 
number and cost since the early 1960s, certainly in the United States but also in many other 
countries (Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations 1994). A mandate 
may require an employer to directly provide some valued good or service, such as one week 
notice of termination or portable vesting of pension benefits, or may require the employer 
to pay a tax or fee to a third party who provides the good or service, such as a government 
or union run unemployment insurance plan.  
Are employment mandates a wise social policy? NE and NL&E recognize that no 
blanket statement can be made on this matter, but it is fair to say that the presumption is 
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against mandates and, therefore, the burden of proof is shifted to proponents who must 
demonstrate a compelling economic case for them (Trebilcock 1993; Collins 2000).  
The skeptical to critical stance NL&E takes toward employment mandates stems 
from the same core efficiency and equity arguments sketched above for direct forms of 
market regulation. The details of the argument differ somewhat, and are best understood 
with a modestly different diagrammatic analysis. Toward that end, consider Figure 2.2.  
 
{Figure 2.2. NL&E Perspective: Economic Effects of an Employment Mandate} 
 
Figure 2.2 depicts a competitive labor market before the imposition of an 
employment mandate. As before, the equilibrium wage/employment level is W1/L1 (point 
A). Now assume the government requires all employers to provide workers with a good, 
such as health insurance. Two things happen:
ii
.The first is that the labor demand curve 
shifts leftward, from D1 to D2. The reason is that at the given wage of W1 the employment 
mandate raises the cost of labor to the firm and (like a tax) induces the firm to reduce 
employment.
iii
 The second effect is to shift to the right (downward) the market labor supply 
curve, from S1 to S2. The supply curve shows the wage rate at which each worker is just 
willing to provide labor; with the provision of the mandated good – presumed to provide 
additional utility to the employees – each worker should now be willing to supply the same 
labor but at a wage lower by the amount of money value of the mandate. If the employees 
give the mandate zero monetary value, the supply curve does not shift; the larger the value 
they attach to the mandate the larger the shift. Assuming the mandate has positive value, 
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Figure 2.2 shows that the effect of the legal mandate is to yield a new equilibrium (point B) 
with a lower wage (W2) and lower employment level (L2).  
What is wrong with this outcome? From a NL&E perspective, the mandate leads to 
another form of deadweight loss in social welfare. The crucial assumption in generating this 
conclusion is that the cost of the mandate to employers is greater than the value attached to 
the mandate by workers. The reasoning is this: if in a perfectly competitive labor market the 
value of a mandate to workers (say $1/hour) is greater than the firms‘ cost of providing it 
(say $.50), then competition and self-interest would have led firms to already provide it 
(because the firms‘ cost of the benefit is $.50 but the employees are willing to accept a 
lower wage up to $.99 to get it) – implying the labor market will already be providing the 
mandated good. If the labor market is not providing the good, then it must be the case that 
the firms‘ provision cost ($.50) is greater than the value to employees (say $.25). In this 
case the cost of the mandate exceeds the value, the demand curve shifts more than the 
supply curve, and there occurs a welfare loss. Again resources are wasted (used 
inefficiently) and the economy is moved to a point inside its production possibility frontier.   
 
Market failure 
 
The fundamental analytical construct in NL&E is the model of a perfectly competitive 
labor market (Addison and Hirsch 1997). Adopted in full form, this model leaves little-to-
no room for legal regulation of labor markets and enactment of employment mandates. But 
even the most ardent proponents of NL&E readily admit that the competitive model does 
not always well represent features of real world labor markets (Friedman and Friedman 
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1980; Posner 1984). Information can be difficult and costly to obtain, mobility from one job 
to another is sometimes impeded, workers and jobs are sometimes quite heterogeneous, and 
some labor markets have only a few buyers. Every such example where a real world market 
condition falls short of the theoretical ideal of perfect competition is called a market failure. 
Clearly, market failure opens up the potential scope and need for employment laws and 
mandates (Trebilcock 1993; Jolls 2006).  
Market failure takes a variety of forms, including the following. 
Imperfect information. The competitive model presumes that both employers and 
employees have complete and costless information regarding the labor market situation, the 
nature of the jobs and work to be done, and all other dimensions of the potential 
transaction. For example, the model assumes both the prospective employer and employee 
know the wage rates offered at other competing firms when, in fact, a good deal of 
ignorance usually exists about this due to the costs of search. Complete information is 
crucial because then every margin of the exchange gets priced at it true social (opportunity) 
cost which, in turn, guarantees that the resulting outcome is Pareto efficient. If information 
is incomplete and costly to obtain, both employer and employee lack knowledge about 
certain aspects or consequences of the bargain and will make choices that are ex post 
inefficient. If employees, for example, are unaware of the health hazards at work then they 
will not bargain for fully compensating wages, thus providing a rationale for government 
regulation of health conditions.   
Asymmetric information. Asymmetric information is a special subset of 
incomplete information but is usefully distinguished because of the unique problems it 
causes. Asymmetric information in the employment relationship gives one party an 
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informational advantage over the other; that is, either the employer or employee possess 
―private‖ or ―hidden‖ information that is unknown to the other. As an example, the 
employer may know better than the job applicant that the job entails a high probability of 
accident, or the job applicant may know that she is frequently late to work but the employer 
is ignorant of this fact. One of the problems asymmetric information leads to is adverse 
selection (Miceli 2004), Adverse selection causes unanticipated negative results for one 
party in an exchange because due to hidden information they cannot screen out the 
purchasers who are most likely to abuse or take advantage of the good or service offered. 
Thus, companies that offer a generous health insurance program or liberal termination 
policy are penalized by adverse selection since they are likely to attract the employees who 
have greater medical or performance problems, causing a rise in their production cost and 
incentive to drop these practices. A solution is to have government mandate a market-wide 
health insurance plan or a just-cause termination policy.  
Employer market power. Another labor market failure arises from factors that 
give the individual firm some degree of power to set non-competitive wages or conditions. 
This condition is usually referred to generically as monopsony power. The classic case of 
employer power is a ―one company town‖ where the firm (a coal mine, textile mill, etc.) is 
the only buyer of labor in the local area. This condition is called a monopsony market, 
which is the labor market analog to a monopoly product market where the firm is the only 
seller of a good. The problem with monopsony is that the firm lacks competition for labor 
and ―exploits‖ workers by paying a wage less that their marginal value to production, just 
as a monopoly firm exploits consumers by charging too high a price for the good (Manning 
2003; Erickson and Mitchell 2008). Employers may have some degree of monopsony 
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power in other market situations, such as oligopsony (only a few employers, such as two 
hospitals in one community), monopsonistic competition (many employers but with 
differentiated jobs and workers or some form of mobility cost), and dual labor markets 
(where forces of discrimination and social norms create a high wage ―primary‖ labor 
market for favored groups of workers and a low wage ―secondary‖ labor market where 
other groups are forced to find jobs).  
The virtue of a competitive labor market is that the individual firm faces a perfectly 
elastic supply curve of labor -- because the firm is only one of many in the market and the 
workers are homogeneous and freely mobile -- and thus has no ability to set a wage or 
employment condition below the market rate. Three conditions, however, can make the 
firm‘s labor supply curve upward sloping, which give it some degree of market power and 
therefore ability to provide less than the going market rate. The first is fewness of firms; the 
second is some form of mobility cost (e.g., loss of training investment or seniority); and the 
third is when workers and/or jobs are differentiated. Whatever the case, the existence of 
employer power provides a rationale for giving workers some form of countervailing 
power, such as a union or minimum wage law.     
Externalities and public goods. Externalities and public goods are closely related 
problems that arise from imperfectly delineated and expensive-to-enforce property rights 
(Cornes and Sandler 1996). If buyers and sellers are able to negotiate complete contracts – 
that is, contracts that specify and enforce every possible feature and future contingency of 
an economic exchange – then supply and demand will successfully price all aspects of the 
exchange and competition brings about a Pareto efficient outcome (Cahuc and Zylberberg 
2004). If property rights are not completely specified or cannot be perfectly enforced, 
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however, then some of the benefits and costs of the exchange ―leak out‖ and affect 
uninvolved third parties, thus leading to inefficient outcomes. An example of a positive 
labor market externality is when a firm mandates a no-smoking rule and the community 
saves money on health care cost; an example of a negative externality is when a firm uses 
child labor and degrades the quality of the nation‘s human capital. With a positive 
externality, the benefit realized by society (the social benefit) is greater than the benefit 
realized by the buyer and seller (the private benefit) leading to an undersupply of the good; 
in the case of a negative externality the social cost is greater than the private cost and the 
―good‖ is oversupplied (Addison and Hirsch 1997; Miceli 2004).  
Closely related is a public good – a good or service where poorly defined property 
rights make it impossible to exclude users who have not paid for it (non-excludability) or, 
alternatively, where the amount consumed by one person does not reduce the amount 
available for others (non-rivalry). Because third parties can enjoy the benefits of the good 
without paying for it, they choose to be ―free riders‖ which leads to underproduction of the 
good relative to the social optimum. An example of a workplace public good is employee 
voice – voice is undersupplied because the worker who makes a suggestion or complaint to 
the boss (e.g., an unsafe machine, excessive line speed) is likely to disproportionately suffer 
the cost (e.g., fired for being a troublemaker) while the benefits of the worker‘s exercise of 
voice are enjoyed by everyone (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Kaufman 2007a). When in the 
case of externalities and public goods individual action in the labor market falls short, a 
rationale opens up for government regulation or provision, such as a maximum hour law to 
restrict over-working and a just-cause termination policy to protect and encourage 
employee voice.  
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Imperfect decision-making. Market failure can also arise due to imperfect 
decision-making on the part of economic agents. The competitive market model assumes 
people make optimal choices, given the information and alternatives known to them. This 
means that their decision making is consistent, self-interested, individualistic, far-sighted, 
and maximizing (Trebilcock 1993, Sunstein 2000). Violation of any of these assumptions in 
a systematic broad-based way among economic agents leads to problems. For example, if 
people do not maximize then their choices will fall short of the best attainable and some 
resources or opportunities will be wasted. Similarly, if people‘s choices are influenced by 
what others do then a form of externality is introduced; while poor choices may arise if 
people are myopic (lack foresight), have irrational preferences (an inconsistent ranking of 
alternatives), are swayed by emotions, or do not act in their own best interest (i.e., forego a 
―merit good,‖ such as wearing safety glasses). Workers, for example, may systematically 
underestimate the probability of injury, get caught up in a ―rat race‖ and work excessive 
hours, or let non-rational sexual desires drive them to harass fellow employees. In each case 
employment regulation may improve welfare, such as a workplace safety law, overtime 
law, and ban on sexual harassment.     
 
Countervailing arguments against employment regulation and mandates  
 
The existence of market failures opens the door in neoclassical economics and NL&E to the 
possibility that employment regulation and legal mandates may be efficiency enhancing 
and thus desirable on economic grounds. For a variety of reasons, however, the regulation 
door in NE and NL&E typically swings open only reluctantly, by a small amount, and only 
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in selective and well documented circumstances. Their basic stance regarding proposals for 
labor market regulation and mandates is ―guilty until proven innocent,‖ which is to say the 
null hypothesis is they are an unwise idea and it is up to their proponents to make a 
convincing case to demonstrate the contrary. Seven lines of argument are put forward in 
support of this position.  
Market failure: spotty and superficial. The first line of defense is the NE/NL&E 
contention that broadly viewed market failure is not a serious or widespread problem. Thus, 
NE and NL&E proponents admit that as a real life matter information is incomplete and 
asymmetric, in some cases labor supply curves to firms are upward sloping, and sometimes 
firms break promises to workers, but they also claim that these problems are like a mild 
skin disease – mostly on the surface and in most cases not serious enough to require 
corrective action (Friedman and Friedman 1980; Posner 1984).  
The efficiency of the common law. A second line of defense is the contention that 
the common law has evolved over time in ways that are aligned with and support economic 
efficiency, thus removing the need for special labor legislation (Rubin,1983; Posner 2007). 
When labor resources are wasted due to mis-structured law, either the employer or 
employee has a financial incentive to challenge the law in court – a process that over time 
winnows out bad law and promotes good (efficient) law.  
Government failure is worse than market failure. Even if labor markets have 
significant imperfections, NE proponents argue that the ―cure‖ – government intervention –
may be worse than the ―disease.‖iv That is, government intervention in the form of 
protective labor laws, social mandates, and regulatory agencies often entail large 
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bureaucracies, expensive compliance costs, rigid rules, and extensive corruption and waste 
that may impose far larger costs and losses in social welfare (Coase 1992).  
Regulatory capture and rent seeking by special interests. Another critique of 
employment regulation is that it is championed as a means to promote the public interest 
but in fact is either designed or subverted to promote sectional interests of specific groups 
and institutions through rent seeking and regulatory capture. Rent seeking occurs when 
groups devote resources to gaining preferential laws and regulations that provide them with 
monopoly rents; regulatory capture occurs when a regulatory body is subverted to serve the 
interests of the regulated party rather than the public. NL&E critics of employment 
regulation cite numerous examples where the law and legal process are (allegedly) used for 
these wealth-reducing purposes. One example is when unions support minimum wage laws 
– ostensibly, it is charged, to help reduce poverty but is really to reduce the threat of lower-
wage nonunion competition (Rottenberg 1981); a second is when members of ―protected 
groups‖ (e.g., racial minorities, women) use anti-discrimination law not to correct injustices 
but pressure firms through actual and threatened court suits for higher pay or security from 
termination (Donahue and Seligman 1991).  
The Coase theorem and private bargaining. The ―Coase theorem,‖ inspired by 
Coase (1960) but originally named and articulated by Stigler (1966), provides a powerful 
NL&E argument against government regulation. The theorem asserts that in a situation of 
zero transaction cost (defined more fully in the next section) individual economic agents 
have an incentive to use private bargaining to re-assign resources to their most productive 
use. The implication is that labor market failures, such as arise from externality and public 
good problems, do not necessarily require a government law or regulation since the parties 
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involved can often work out through negotiation and compromise a reasonably efficient 
solution (Miceli 2004).  
Maximum of liberty and freedom of contract. NL&E proponents believe 
competitive markets, even if marred with certain blemishes and shortcomings, should 
nonetheless be protected from government regulation as much as possible because they 
promote highly valued normative ends, such as personal liberty, freedom of contract, and 
individual initiative and responsibility. Economic freedom, they argue, promotes and 
supports political freedom (Friedman 1962; Epstein 1984).  
Empirical evidence. Putting aside theoretical arguments, NL&E proponents claim 
the bulk of the empirical evidence on the relationship between labor market regulation and 
economic growth also supports their minimalist position. A large number of studies have 
examined the cross-sectional relationship between extent of labor market regulation in a 
political jurisdiction (state, province, country) and a measure of economic performance 
(e.g., output or productivity growth). The bulk find a negative relationship, indicating more 
regulation inhibits wealth creation (e.g., Koedijk and Kremers 1996; Barro 1997; Hall and 
Jones 1999). Civil law countries, which have greater statutory regulation of employment, 
also have lower average growth rates than common law countries (Scully 1992).   
 
Institutional Law and Economics 
 
I now turn to what Hovenkamp (1990) identifies as the First Great Law & Economics 
Movement. This movement for the most part languishes in obscurity and neglect in the 
modern-day law and economics literature. Indeed, as earlier indicated, most people speak 
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of L&E in the singular. Illustrative of the neglect the first law and economics movements 
suffers, one of its most active and influential areas of scholarship and policy activism was 
in the area of labor and employment, yet, to the best of my knowledge, no modern scholarly 
article or book has done a theoretically substantive review and development of this 
literature. In what follows I take a first step in this direction, although given the nature of 
my assignment and the constraints of space it is necessarily suggestive. To some significant 
degree, this exposition is also heavily grounded on my own interpretations and 
constructions, as developed in previous books and articles.   
 
People, ideas, and historical context 
 
The First Law and Economics Movement was an American development spanning roughly 
the period 1885-1940. It had substantial European roots, however; most particularly in 
Germany where economists of the historical school were endeavoring to integrate law into 
economics (Pearson 1997; Mackaay 2000). The first American law and economics 
movement represented a fusion of two early 20
th
 century intellectual developments: 
institutionalism in economics and legal realism in law (Fried 1998). For both expositional 
and theoretical reasons, I henceforth refer to this movement as Institutional Law and 
Economics (IL&E). There remains a small but active contingent of economists and legal 
scholars writing in the IL&E tradition per se (e.g., Samuels and Schmid 1981; 
Oppenheimer and Mercuro 2005), although employment issues do not prominently figure 
in this literature.  
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Much of what comprises the ―traditional‖ post-World War II field of labor law, 
particularly the collective relations part, also has significant roots in the First Law and 
Economics movement, as does the field of industrial relations. As described below, a 
fundamental proposition in IL&E is that since labor markets and the employment 
relationship deal with a uniquely human commodity — labor — they require a more 
complex, interdisciplinary, and social-oriented theory to adequately understand them. This 
proposition, in turn, is reflected in the insistence of many traditional labor law scholars that 
their field has a large degree of autonomy from the common law (Wedderburn 1988; 
Davies and Freedland 2000); it also explains their skepticism/hostility to the imperialistic 
and market-oriented nature of NL&E theory and the strong free market ethos of NL&E 
policy prescriptions (Collins 2000; Deakin and Wilkinson 2005). Also evident is greater 
emphasis given to and acceptance of collective forms of behavior and social control.  
The IL&E movement can be roughly divided into two phases: the first is an early formative 
or ―pre-organized‖ period, lasting about twenty years in which key ideas and conceptual 
building blocks were advanced, and the second is the consolidated or ―organized‖ period 
when the movement coalesced into a self-conscious and self-identified entity with a 
significant intellectual output and influence on policy (Yonay 1998). The IL&E movement 
peaked in power and influence in the decade 1935-1945, marked by the legislative triumphs 
of the New Deal period, and then went into decline. In the labor and employment area, the 
IL&E ascendancy was marked by enactment of the triumvirate of landmark bills: the Social 
Security Act (SSA), National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA). This legislation was supported by a wide swath of the economics community 
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(Prasch 1998), including labor economists Paul Douglas and Harry Millis of Chicago 
(Millis 1935; Douglas 1938).  
The IL&E movement‘s subsequent loss of influence and momentum after World 
War II was signaled by the revival of neoclassical economics and enactment of 
conservative-inspired labor legislation, such as the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA. 
The movement also lost momentum partly because its successes reduced some of the most 
obvious and compelling reasons for being; the emergence of problems, excesses and public 
dissatisfactions with parts of the New Deal policy program; and because most its big 
thinkers and doers died or retired. Emblematically, the focal point for the IL&E research 
and lobbying program for expanded labor law was the American Association for Labor 
Legislation (AALL) – created in 1905 at the end of the first phase and allowed to expire in 
1942 at roughly the end of the second phase (Moss 1996). 
The first phase of the IL&E movement began in the mid-1880s and extended into 
the early 1900s. The most visible starting point is the founding of the American Economic 
Association (AEA) in 1885 under the primary leadership of Richard Ely (Rader 1966). The 
AEA was intended by Ely to be a center for development of a new economics, largely 
inspired by the historical and social economics popular in Germany and (to lesser extent) 
England (Koot 1987; Kaufman 2004a). The new economics in America a generation later 
evolved into institutional economics. 
The movement for a new economics was an outgrowth of the ―Methodenstreit‖ (war 
over method) that broke out in numerous countries in the 1880s between the orthodox 
adherents of classical/neoclassical economics and a quasi-heterodox band of intellectual 
insurgents (Dorfman 1949; Pearson 1997). The new economics was developed as an 
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alternative approach on three fronts. With regard to methodology, it promoted a more 
inductive, empirical and interdisciplinary research program. In the area of theory-building, 
the new economics sought to develop a more organic, dynamic and realistic theory of the 
capitalist economy which gives greater weight to human agency, human and market 
imperfections, legal, social and business institutions, and ethical considerations of  public 
interest and social purpose. And, with regard to policy, it represented an attack on the 
laissez-faire implications of classical/neoclassical theory and an endeavor to provide an 
alternative positive intellectual rationale for expanded government economic regulation, 
trade unionism, and redistribution of rights, power and wealth (Rutherford 2001; Kaufman 
1997; 2005).  
The oppositional and reformist nature of the new school of economics, and its 
substantial concern with labor issues, is well indicated in the statement of principles Ely 
drafted for the AEA. It read, in part: 
 
We regard the State as an educational and ethical agency whose positive aid is an 
indispensable condition to human progress. While we recognize the necessity of 
individual initiative in industrial life, we hold that the doctrine of laissez-faire is 
unsafe in politics and unsound in morals…We hold that the conflict of labor and 
capital has brought to the front a vast number of social problems whose solution is 
impossible without the united efforts of Church, State and Science. (Rader 1966, p. 
35)   
 
Also ranking as a founding moment was publication in 1887 of economist Henry 
Carter Adam‘s influential essay ―The State in Relation to Industrial Action‖ (reprinted in 
Dorfman 1969). He sets out the leit motiv of what would later become IL&E when he says, 
―It should be the purpose of all laws, touching matters of business, to maintain the 
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beneficent results of competitive action while safeguarding society from the evil 
consequences of unrestrained competition‖ (p. 86). Adams more tightly links economics 
and law in his 1896 AEA presidential address, entitled ―Economics and Jurisprudence‖ 
(also reprinted in Dorfman 1969). The purpose of law, he states, is to ―formulate those rules 
of conduct essential to the realization of justice‖ (p. 138) and then observes that laissez-
faire must be replaced by active social reform since ―the workings of self-interest in the 
industrial field do not in all respects appear to be in harmony with the ideals of justice.‖ 
Adams‘ case for economic reform and regulation is based not only in correcting injustice, 
however, but also on improving economic efficiency, per his observation that ―there are 
many who profess to see that it [the workings of self-interest] places in jeopardy material 
progress itself.‖ (p. 143).  
Institutional economics (IE) and legal realism (LR) started to form in the early 
1900s and came into their own in the 1920s. As earlier indicated, they went into significant 
decline after World War II, although in recent years both a ―new‖ institutional economics 
and a ―new‖ legal realism have appeared (Dow 1997; Farber 2001). The new institutional 
economics, however, is more neoclassical in orientation and policy stance, although in 
certain respects Coase (in particular) has at least one foot solidly in the early institutional 
camp (Medema 1996).   
Frequently IE is said to have had three founders, Thorstein Veblen, Wesley Mitchell 
and John Commons, along with several other important contributors, such as Walton 
Hamilton, John Maurice Clark, Morris Copeland,  and Rexford Tugwell (Rutherford 2001). 
Several of these people, such as Veblen and Mitchell, had only modest interest in the 
interface between law and economics and largely fall out of the story told here. Far more 
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central are Commons, Hamilton and Clark, with the former occupying center place in what 
follows.  
The heart of early IE in labor was at Wisconsin. Ely brought Commons to 
Wisconsin in 1904 and Commons assembled in the 1920s the largest group of labor 
economists at any American university. Commons made the law a central part of his 
version of IE, as indicated in the title of his book Legal Foundations of Capitalism (1924), 
and he explicitly sought to develop the interface between law and economics, per the title 
of a 1925 essay in the Yale Law Review titled ―Law and Economics.‖ Commons also 
figures large in the L&E of labor since he was at the time not only the leading labor 
economist in the nation but also the foremost academic authority on labor law, per his text 
Principles of Labor Legislation (1
st
 ed., 1916, with Andrews). Commons was one of the 
great social reformers of the pre-New Deal era and a life-long opponent of laissez-faire, 
seeing it as a cause of great human suffering and impulse for radical politics and socialist 
revolution. Commons‘ reformist but pro-capitalist stance is indicated by his remark that his 
life goal as an institutional economist was to ―save capitalism by making it good‖ 
(Commons 1934a, p. 143); his reformist credentials in labor are also revealed by the remark 
of Kenneth Boulding that ―Commons was the intellectual origin of the New Deal, of labor 
legislation, of social security, of the whole movement in the country toward a welfare state‖ 
(1957, p. 7). 
Legal realism shared many of the tenets of IE but came to them from the subject of 
law (Letier 2003; Sunstein 2004). The roots of LR are often traced to jurist Oliver Wendell 
Holmes (Fried 1998). Prominent writers in LR in the early twentieth century included 
Robert Hale, Roscoe Pound, Wesley Hofeld, Karl Llewellyn, Felix Cohen, and Jerome 
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Frank. The LR school was a reaction against excessive formalism in law, just as IE was in 
economics, and LR also had a base in pragmatism and multidisciplinary studies. More 
importantly, however, LR was also a reaction against the laissez-faire constitutionalism of 
the Supreme Court in the early twentieth century and its sweeping limitations on state 
regulatory power under the doctrine of ―substantive due process,‖ particularly as applied to 
employment regulation (McCurdy 1984).  These decisions, in part, rested on or were 
parallel to tenets of orthodox economics, such as free competition and freedom of contract, 
leading Robert Hale to caustically remark (quotations from Fried 1998), ―The practical 
function of economic theory is merely to prove to statesmen the wisdom of leaving 
[economic] matters alone‖ (p. 45). In place of the laissez-faire dogmatism of orthodoxy, 
Hale counseled that ―the question of the maintenance or the alteration of our institutions 
[e.g., laws and regulations] must be discussed on its pragmatic merits,‖ (p. 89), requiring in 
turn scientific study of ―the function performed by the law in the production and 
distribution of wealth‖ (p. 10).  
 
Key IL&E assumptions 
 
The early developers of IE and LR were engaged in a three-fold exercise: development of 
an alternative theoretical base for economics and L&E, use of this alternative theoretical 
base to craft and implement a program of social reform and expanded market regulation, 
and promulgation of a more humanistic ethical credo to guide research and policy. They 
never succeeded in formalizing, or even well articulating, the first part – an alternative 
theoretical paradigm. But a synthesis of this large and not always commensurable literature 
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suggests the following set of fundamental IL&E assumptions, which has an orientation to 
labor and employment issues (Kaufman 1997, 2004b, 2005, 2007b, c).    
Purpose of an economy. The purpose of an economy is to serve human ends. One 
way it does this is to operate efficiently so people have the maximum of goods and 
services. But the grand objective of human existence is not efficiency (the ―largest GDP‖) 
but the ―good life‖ (Slichter 1931). What exactly constitutes the good life is subject to 
debate, but it certainly includes greater amounts of economic security, procedural and 
distributive justice, and opportunities for self-development and self-actualization than are 
provided by the efficiency criterion alone (Sunstein 2004). IL&E proponents would agree 
that economic policy should seek to get society on the production possibility frontier but 
only if the ―goods‖ (or ―social wealth‖) included in calculating the frontier include not just 
GDP-type goods but also goods such as economic security, social justice, fulfilling jobs and 
healthful working conditions. Without this broader perspective, the interests of people 
(including workers) get subordinated by a narrow efficiency/materialist welfare objective to 
doing what is best for the economy, rather than structuring and operating the economy to 
benefit people.   
Liberty. The NL&E version of liberty is negative liberty – i.e., absence of restraint 
– which leads them to advocate minimal government market regulation. From an IL&E 
perspective, however, ―liberty to starve‖ or ―liberty to work a fourteen hour day‖ is not an 
attractive conception of liberty; likewise, to say that both a poor person and rich person 
have an equal freedom to quit a dangerous or dirty job if they do not like it greatly empties 
the concept of freedom of meaningful significance (Hale 1926; Samuels, Medema and 
Schmid 1997; Fried 1998). Seen in this light, the ―freedom of contract‖ trumpeted by 
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NL&E may be a façade that hides the whip of economic coercion wielded by one person 
with control of strategic resources (e.g., an employer offering scarce job opportunities) over 
another person who has few resources and must trade or go hungry (e.g., an employee with 
dependent family members and no alternatives source of income). Proponents of IL&E, 
therefore, base their theory and policy program on a concept of positive liberty. Each 
person has positive liberty when they have the resources needed to command the essentials 
of life, thus giving them not only the legal space to construct their life but also the 
economic space (Sen 1999). 
Labor is human. In NL&E, labor is modeled as not substantively different from 
other factor inputs or goods and services and, hence, labor markets are also modeled as not 
substantively different from other kinds of markets (Addison and Hirsch 1997). Further, 
from a welfare perspective NL&E views labor solely as a factor input that does not itself 
count in social welfare but rather contributes to welfare only to the extent it is efficiently 
used to produce final goods and services for consumers. In IL&E, explicit recognition is 
given to the fact that labor services are embodied in human beings (Commons 1934b; 
Spector 2006). This fact, it is maintained, fundamentally changes theorizing about labor 
(described below); it also calls attention to the fact that if the goal of an economy is to 
improve human welfare then people‘s welfare as workers should be given consideration 
above and beyond their contribution to production and satisfaction of consumers‘ interests.  
Ownership and property rights. Institutional economics is built on the concept of 
ownership and correlative concept of property rights, per the statement of Commons 
(1934b, p. 5) that ―ownership becomes the foundation of institutional economics.‖ Property 
rights also figure prominently in the NIE (Furubotn and Richter 1997; Coase 1992); they 
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have also been extensively examined by several prominent NL&E writers (e.g., 
Demsetz).Without prior specification of property rights and ownership fundamental 
economic constructs such as commodities, production functions, and demand and supply 
curves have no basis. These property rights also include not only ownership of economic 
goods but fundamental human and social rights.  
Institutions. Institutions are bodies of rules, both formal and informal and explicit 
and tacit, that are built out of property rights (broadly defined) and define the rules of the 
economic game and the constraints, opportunity sets, incentives, and strategic 
interdependencies faced by economic agents (Coase 1992; Furubotn and Richter 1997). All 
economic activity is ―institutional‖ since its takes place within and is structured and guided 
by human-made institutions; it is also inextricably linked to concerns of fairness and status 
since the laws, rules, norms and customs created and enforced by institutions serve in part 
to apportion justice and social standing.    
Sovereignty. Economics is always ―political economy‖ because the institutions and 
their derivative rules which guide and structure economic activity are in part determined 
through a political process in which people individually and collectively seek to capture 
and use the power of sovereignty to shape the institutions and rules to promote their 
interests (Commons 1950).   
Behavioral/Social model of the human agent. People are modeled as largely 
purposeful and self-interested, but decision-making is subject to bounded rationality and 
behavior is influenced by emotions, social interdependencies, and ethical precepts 
(Kaufman 1999b; Sunstein 2000; Schmid 2004). A key part of bounded rationality is that 
many future events are subject to fundamental uncertainty -- that is, cannot be represented 
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by even a probability distribution; another key part is the distorting effect imparted to 
behavior by emotions such as anger, hate, love and pride.  
Transactions and transaction cost. A transaction is a legal transfer of ownership; 
transaction cost is the real resources used to effectuate and enforce this transfer (Commons 
1934b; Coase 1937). 
Modes of coordination. Economies have alternative institutional modes for 
coordinating transactions; the two most important for theory are (1) markets and price, and 
(2) organizations and command (Williamson 1985; Kaufman 2003).   
Power. Power is the ability to satisfy one‘s desires and obtain a greater share of an 
institution‘s scarce goods (material and non-material). Power is influenced by how greatly 
an economic agent needs/wants an outcome and how long the agent can hold out in the 
bargaining vis a vis the other side (Samuels, Medema and Schmid 1997).  
Reasonable value. Economic agents individually and collectively have a notion of 
what is fair and reasonable; whenever an outcome/ process falls outside the bound of 
reasonableness they undertake action to alter the institutional matrix of rules and rights 
(Commons 1934b; McIntyre and Ramstad 2002).  
 
Critique of the competitive model  
 
The IL&E analysis of labor markets and employment relationships proceeds in two steps. 
The first is a critique and deconstruction of the competitive labor market model that forms 
the core of the NL&E paradigm; the second is construction of an alternative model of the 
labor market and employment relationship that provides a more positive – but still 
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delimited -- place for labor and employment regulation. Both steps proceed on the basis of 
one fundamental proposition: that labor is human and not a commodity (Budd 2004; 
Kaufman 2004). This proposition, I note, is the cornerstone for the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) and its program of international labor standards, for the first of nine 
principles listed in the ILO‘s constitution reads: ―Labor should not be regarded as a 
commodity or article of commerce‖ (ILO.org). Elsewhere, I have also made the case that 
this proposition also provides the positive and normative foundation for the field of 
industrial relations, where in my interpretation industrial relations represents what is in 
effect the labor subfield of institutional economics (Kaufman 2004a).  
The core of NL&E is the competitive model of labor markets, and this model gives 
rise to the neoliberal agenda of free(er) labor markets and deregulation of the employment 
relationship. Various qualifications and extensions, as just reviewed, soften and in some 
cases overturn the competitive model‘s negative verdict; nevertheless, when used as the 
starting point or baseline for theoretical analysis it inevitably gives the upper hand to 
opponents of regulation and puts proponents in a weaker, defensive position. Some critics 
of NE charge it has not only a free market bias but also an anti-labor bias, per the comment 
of Jospeh Stiglitz (2000, p. 3), that, ―it might seem as if the fundamental propositions of 
neoclassical economics were designed to undermine the rights and position of labor.‖  
Recognizing these biases, the early participants in IL&E, as well as major figures in 
post-World War II industrial relations, spent considerable effort trying to displace or 
discredit the competitive model of labor markets (Commons 1919; Taylor and Pierson 
1957).  This effort, as judged by most economists, largely failed and the competitive model 
remains the paradigmatic core of NE, albeit surrounded by a rapidly expanding ―protective 
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belt‖ of secondary theorizing (Cahuc and Zylberberg 2004). Recent developments in IE 
theory, however, reveal that the competitive model has, in fact, a deep internal 
contradiction that appears to challenge its logical coherence, thereby calling into question 
the foundation on which NL&E is built (Kaufman 2007d; 2008b).  
The logical contradiction arises by considering the consequences of transaction cost 
for the competitive model. The concept of a transaction was first developed by Commons 
(1934b, p. 55) who defined it as a ―legal transfer of property rights,‖ the concept of 
transaction cost was then independently developed by Coase (1937) and formally extended 
by Williamson (1985) and others in the NIE. As such, it is a clearly an IE concept, 
illustrated by the fact it is still today widely omitted from leading microeconomics and 
labor economics textbooks, such as Varian (2002) and Ehrenberg and Smith (2006). It is 
omitted in part because neoclassical price theory assumes market exchange proceeds with 
zero cost, so transaction cost effectively drops out of the analysis (Dow 1997; Coase 1992).   
As one example, the logic of positive transaction cost implies that a perfectly competitive 
labor market cannot exist on the pure plane of theory. This result is fundamental since it 
makes derivation of a demand and supply diagram impossible, thus seriously crippling the 
major theoretical tool NL&E uses to critique labor law and employment regulation 
(Kaufman 2008b).  
A principle of IE is that production and exchange, other things equal, are either 
coordinated by markets and price or, alternatively, organizations and command, depending 
which entails least cost. It follows that if transaction cost is zero in a perfectly competitive 
economy then market coordination is everywhere the most efficient and firms (a system of 
command coordination) vertically disintegrate until all firms (and other production units) 
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are one person operations in the form of sole proprietorships, independent contractors, and 
family farms. With this result in mind, Coase remarks, ―In the absence of transaction cost, 
there is no economic basis for the existence of the firm‖ (1988, p. 14).v 
The implication of this result is fatal for the logical coherence of the competitive 
labor market model. A labor market, as conventionally conceived, is a trading area where 
employers‘ demand people to provide labor services; household members offer to be 
employees and provide labor services; and flexible wage rates match up the two. In this 
spirit, Milgrom and Roberts state, ―The study of labor markets, employment, and wages is a 
major element of standard neoclassical economics‖ (1992, p. 327, emphasis added). 
But, if all firms are one person units, they have no demand for employees and, thus, no 
reason exists for either a labor market or employment relationship. The two disappear, as 
does the concept of a ―wage.‖ These firms instead acquire labor services in the form of 
intermediate goods produced by other one person production units (say operating as 
independent contractors or sole proprietor firms) coordinated by price (not wage rates) in 
product markets.  
We see, therefore, that the assumptions of the perfectly competitive labor market 
model preclude as a matter of logic the very object it seeks to theorize. The model, and the 
corollary labor demand and supply diagram, do not have a coherent microeconomic 
foundation and thus are to some degree ad hoc. Further, and more importantly, this 
conclusion means that labor markets are always and everywhere imperfect and that an 
employment relationship only exists when there is market failure (Kaufman 2008b). Labor 
market imperfections and failures are not occasional or superficial problems but are 
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endemic and serious; otherwise, labor markets and very large multi-person firms would not 
exist. 
I should note that this conclusion does not mean that IE advocates scrapping 
altogether the competitive model and labor demand and supply diagram, as they are 
admittedly insightful tools for research and pedagogical purposes. The goal, rather, is to 
further circumscribe the reach and power of the model by demonstrating it does not rest on 
a solid microeconomic foundation, thus opening larger space for theories of imperfect 
competition and thereby leveling the playing field for the IL&E side.  
 
IE demonstrates that the model of a perfectly competitive labor market is a logical non 
sequitur. This is an act of deconstruction. Next is the task of construction and, in particular, 
development of a positive theoretical case for employment regulation.  
Toward that end, I briefly present four rationales, based on IL&E concepts, for why 
labor and employment regulation can advance economic efficiency. I focus on efficiency in 
order to most directly challenge NL&E; other welfare goals are also noted, however. The 
discussion makes use of the three graphs depicted in Figure 2.3. [Located on p. 48.] Panel 
(a) shows a model of an imperfectly competitive labor market (e.g., some version of 
monopsony); panel (b) shows a competitive labor market model at the aggregate (national) 
level; and panel (c) shows a competitive labor market for a particular occupation or grade 
of labor. The analysis selectively makes use of all three diagrams.  
 
Labor‘s inequality of bargaining power  
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The first rationale for labor and employment regulation is that workers suffer an inequality 
of bargaining power because imperfect labor markets and a lopsided distribution of 
resources and rights puts employers in the dominant position in wage bargaining and the 
individual worker in a weaker and dependent position (Commons and Andrews 1936; 
Kaufman 1989; Klare 2000. See Kennedy, 1982, for a critical analysis). With inequality of 
bargaining power, market competition cannot fully protect the wages, conditions and 
treatment of labor and thus some countervailing institutional mechanism must be 
introduced to ensure efficiency, equity, and due process. The primary social purposes are, 
first, economic protection of workers and, second, political democracy in workforce 
governance.  Here are the classic IL&E rationales for employment regulation. 
 
In developing the idea of inequality of bargaining power, I proceed in two steps: 
The first is to consider the role of imperfect competition in labor markets, and the second is 
to consider the role of lopsided resources and rights. The two are distinct and need to be 
treated separately.  
 Imperfect competition. A situation of equal bargaining power exists in a 
competitive labor market since both employer and employee are wage takers, meaning 
neither has power to raise or lower the wage (and other conditions) above or below the 
competitive market rate. This yields both efficiency and fairness (marginal productivity 
justice) and the market provides full protection to workers. It does so through two means: 
workers can, with zero cost, quit and find jobs elsewhere (‗vote with their feet‘) and 
competition forces firms to provide ―optimal‖ terms and conditions of labor in order to 
recruit and keep a workforce.  
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But what if labor markets are imperfect? In theory, an imperfect market may give 
the power advantage to either the employer or employee. Although both can occur, the 
IL&E position is that most often it is the workers – particularly those with fewer skills, less 
education, or from disadvantaged groups -- who suffer unequal bargaining power. The 
reasoning is simple: who feels the greater pressure to reach an agreement and fill the job, 
the company or the worker? And which party has the greater resources and alternative 
options to fall back on if they do not reach agreement? In most circumstances, the obvious 
answer is the company, particularly when the usual overhang of excess labor supply in the 
job market is factored in (Taylor 1995). In this situation, early IL&E proponents thought it 
was obvious that in wage bargaining between US Steel and the individual worker the 
imperfections in the labor market and superior ―withholding ability‖ give the employer the 
distinct power advantage and ability to gain terms and conditions of employment that favor 
its interests. This occurs both in the external labor market where the employer exercises 
some degree of monopoly power in wage determination and in the governance system of 
the firm (the internal labor market) where the employer exercises some degree of autocratic 
power to craft, administer and enforce the rules of the workplace in a unilateral and 
sometimes arbitrary and unfair manner. Employment regulation, therefore, serves to protect 
the underdog, level the playing field, ensure industrial democracy, and create a balanced, 
humane employment system (Summers 1979; Dau-Schmidt 1992; Weiler 1990; Budd 
2004; Kaufman 2007b). 
The IL&E position is that in both theory and practice labor markets are always and 
everywhere imperfectly competitive; hence, internal firm governance systems are also to 
some degree employer dominated (Block, Berg and Belman 2004). Several reasons can be 
  
44 
 
cited. First, we have noted that a labor market and employment relationship can only exist 
with positive transaction cost. Positive transaction cost, in turn, arises from conditions of 
bounded rationality which, in turn, lead to incomplete contracts, imprecisely defined 
property rights, and gaps in legal enforcement of these rights. Hence, external and internal 
labor markets are unavoidably the site of a host of contracting imperfections, as recently 
emphasized in the modern literature on problems of principle-agent, moral hazard, strategic 
bargaining and adverse selection (Miller 1991; Bowles and Gintis 1993; Cahuc and 
Zylberberg 2004). 
Second, a crucial assumption in the competitive model is that both individual firms 
and workers are wage takers, which is to say the wage is set by impersonal market forces 
and is outside the control of any agent. But IE shows that employers always and 
everywhere have some ability to set the wage (and other terms, conditions, and rules), at 
least as long as labor services are embodied in human beings. An essential condition of the 
competitive model is that labor is a homogeneous (undistinguishable) commodity. But this 
condition is violated by the very nature of the employment relationship. The reason is that 
the labor services are embodied in the worker (a form of indivisibility) and cannot be 
separated at the time of sale; thus the worker and employer of necessity form a personal 
relationship at the point of production (Prasch 2003). This fact distinguishes ―outsiders‖ 
from ―insiders,‖ which along with search and mobility costs due to imperfect information 
(an attribute of positive transaction cost), makes incumbent employees a preferable and 
frequently less expensive source of labor services for firms than job candidates in the 
external labor market.  
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Hence, workers are not homogeneous but heterogeneous, leading to a situation of 
monopsony -- broadly defined to include oligopsony, monopsonistic competition, and other 
market situations with costly mobility -- in which the labor supply curve to the firm is 
upward sloping (Card and Krueger 1995; Bhaskar and To 1999; Manning 2003; Erickson 
and Mitchell 2008). This is illustrated in panel (a) of Figure 2.3 by the rising supply curve 
S1, accompanied by a rising marginal cost of labor curve MCL1. In this labor market, the 
firm sets employment at L1 (where MRP1 intersects MCL1 at point A) and pays a wage of 
W1 (given by the supply curve at point B). This wage is lower than the competitive wage 
W2 (point C), is determined by the firm rather than the impersonal forces of demand and 
supply (although they set upper and lower limits), and gives rise to exploitation of labor, 
typically defined as the difference between the workers‘ marginal contribution to 
production and the wage (points A-B). Alternatively, the firm may pay a competitive wage 
but exploit workers by reducing other terms and conditions of employment, such as benefits 
or safety expenditures; another option is to exercise its power through oppressive or 
onerous work supervision and discipline.  
IE claims, therefore, that: (1) the homogeneity condition is always violated in an 
employment relationship (or leasing arrangement, etc.), so by definition labor markets are 
imperfect; (2) with an upward sloping labor supply curve, the individual firm gains some 
market power to set the wage, implying wage rates are always and everywhere a form of 
administered price and labor markets always and everywhere feature some element of 
employer control and potential wage exploitation and workforce autocracy; and (3) yet 
again the competitive demand and supply diagram deconstructs since with any element of 
employer power in the labor market it is impossible to derive a well-defined, continuous 
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market labor demand curve. That is, in the monopsony diagram the firm has a well-defined 
marginal revenue product curve but not a well-defined firm/market demand curve, just as 
with product market monopoly the firm has a well-defined marginal cost curve but not a 
well-defined supply curve. 
In passing, note that IE is not denying that at some broad level there is an inverse 
relationship between the price of labor and the quantity demanded. As Becker (1962) has 
shown, the law of demand is a fundamental fact of scarcity and is not a unique conclusion 
of any one theory, implying the existence of some type of negative employment effect is 
not discriminating evidence in support of the NE competitive market model. Rather, the 
real issue separating IE and NE is the tightness and sensitivity of this relationship.  
NE price theory posits a monotonic, unique, well-defined inverse relationship between the 
wage and quantity demanded of labor – a product of complete contracts, a commodity 
theory of labor and perfect competition, while IE posits that the demand relationship has 
gaps, a certain degree of indeterminacy (a demand ―band‖ instead of a curve), and possibly 
a vertical or positive-sloped section over a certain range, all due to a human theory of labor, 
incomplete contracts, imperfect competition, efficiency wage effects, etc. Thus, the 
zero/positive employment effect of a minimum wage found by Card and Krueger (1995) is 
entirely compatible with IE theory but not a straightforward version of NE theory.  
 Unequal resources and rights. Labor may also suffer from unequal bargaining 
power in a perfectly competitive labor market if the distribution of resources and rights is 
greatly skewed in favor of employers. I call this a case of unequal bargaining power ―before 
the market,‖ in contrast to the earlier case of inequality ―within the market.‖  
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Inequality of bargaining power before the market examines the wage/employment 
outcome with regard to alternative distributions/specifications of property rights and 
ownership. We again need a base-line in order to compare situations of equal and unequal 
bargaining power. For this purpose Commons (1934b, p. 683-4) invented the concept of 
reasonable value. Reasonable value is the community‘s conception of the legitimate, 
morally justifiable upper and lower bounds to the wage bargain, given the economic 
fundamentals existing at the time and the range of feasible/practical alternatives facing both 
parties (McIntyre and Ramstad 2002). Reasonable value is inherently subjective and 
contingent over time and place, yet it is also determinate in that a sovereign governmental 
body, such as the US Supreme Court (from which Commons derived this concept), has to 
determine the boundary lines between legitimate and illegitimate contract terms. To do this, 
the Court devised in the early twentieth century the doctrines of ―reasonableness‖ and 
―conscienability.‖ The idea is the Court refuses to set aside voluntarily negotiated contracts 
unless the negotiation process and/or terms are deemed unreasonable and/or 
unconscionable by prevailing community standards (Commons and Andrews 1936).  
Inequality of bargaining power before the market, therefore, corresponds to wages 
and other conditions outside the range of reasonable value, with the connotation that these 
terms could only arise by a constellation of bargaining power that in current circumstances 
is sufficiently lopsided that it violates community standards of legitimacy. From this 
perspective, freedom of contract can be a cruel fiction that allows one side to impose 
onerous and exploitative terms on another. As before, in theory inequality of bargaining 
power before the market can favor either employer or employee; in practice, however, IE 
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argues it usually favors employers and works against individual workers, particularly in 
early phases of economic development.  
With regard to resources, for example, employers have far deeper pockets than 
workers who live paycheck to paycheck and can thus survive much longer if no deal is 
struck. Likewise, employers are less pressured to strike a deal since their revenue stream 
typically continues even if one job is vacant, while a worker‘s revenue stream typically 
ceases without that job. Also important, employers typically face more alternative job 
seekers than individual workers face alternative job openings (i.e., workers are usually on 
the ―long side‖ of the labor market).  
Rights are a second factor that determines bargaining power. IE contends that in all 
capitalist societies legal rights start out heavily skewed in favor of employers. One reason is 
that capital is typically scarce while labor is cheap and, therefore, societies give little regard 
to protecting labor; another is that employers have preponderant access to and influence in 
the legislative and judicial arenas (Commons 1934b, p. 673). Thus, while NL&E theorizes 
that the evolution of the common law is driven by pressures of efficiency, IL&E posits that 
in addition to efficiency pressures the common law also evolves from political contestation 
– that is, the process where social ―outsiders‖ struggle to become ―insiders‖ and, to the 
degree they are successful, judges re-interpret the common law to incorporate their interests 
(Deakin and Wilkinson 2005).  
As seen in IE, many legal rules a century ago, and some today, regarding ownership 
and property rights create unequal bargaining power before the market (Adams 1886; 
Commons and Andrews 1936). One such example is employment-at-will. In any real world 
labor market the costs of employment-at-will fall disproportionately on workers, 
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undercutting their bargaining power vis-à-vis the firm and thus shifting their labor supply 
curve to the right (with unequal bargaining power, their minimum supply price is reduced). 
Also relevant is immigration law. A legal rule that allows large immigration into the nation 
also shifts the labor supply curve to the right, lowering wages and conditions for workers. 
From a NE perspective, the new wage outcome is competitive and prima facie good for 
social welfare since efficiency is promoted when market prices adjust to reflect a change in 
relative factor scarcities. From an IE perspective, on the other hand, the same outcome, 
although nominally competitive, may well be in the bigger picture a socially inefficient and 
unjust outcome because it reduces the wages and conditions of labor below a reasonable or 
even long-run subsistence level (e.g., child labor, lack of  health insurance). In fact, IE 
contends that what appears to be a competitive market outcome is in fact a case of 
institutional exploitation – the difference between a minimally reasonable wage and set of 
employment conditions and the actual level resulting from the skewed rules of the game 
(Taylor 1977).   
Before moving on, it is useful to point out that employers are not the only or 
perhaps even major party using government to skew the rules of the game against the 
interests of workers. Consumers also have an incentive to do so (Webb and Webb 1897; 
Commons 1909). Consumers have dual interests to the degree that they not only buy goods 
but also sell labor. Nonetheless, IE surmises that their self-interest on balance tilts toward 
lower priced goods, given that lower prices of the N consumption goods in the economy 
improves every consumer‘s welfare but most forms of higher labor standards improve 
welfare for only a sub-group. If we look at a minimum wage, for example, most people 
work at companies that pay considerably above this level, so voting for political candidates 
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who favor a minimum wage increase is likely to reduce their real income (via higher prices) 
without any compensating gain in wages. Examined this way, both consumers and firms 
have a shared interest in lower labor cost and shared interest in laws, regulations and an 
institutional infrastructure that promote such. A political economy perspective on labor 
markets suggests, therefore, that the erstwhile competitive labor market may well be in fact 
a disguised site of greatly unequal bargaining power.   
{Figure 2.3. IL&E Perspective: Economic Effects of Labor Market Regulation} 
 
Involuntary unemployment and destructive competition 
 
A second rationale for labor market regulation is labor market and macroeconomic 
stabilization. This goal also complements the employee protection and industrial 
democracy goals by shielding wages, working conditions and treatment from the downward 
drag exerted by excess labor supply in the aggregate market economy.  
Commons asserted that chronic unemployment is the single greatest cause of labor 
problems and capitalism‘s greatest vulnerability (1934b, p. 804); the IL&E case for labor 
market regulation rests, in turn, as much on the evils of unrestrained/excessive competition 
in labor markets as restricted competition. In this regard, the early institutionalists were 
―proto-Keynesians‖ in that they rejected Say‘s Law, emphasized the link between 
purchasing power and full employment, and rejected wage reductions as a method to 
eliminate excess labor supply (Kaufman 1997; Atkinson and Oleson 1998).  
Neoclassical economists draw the demand and supply curve diagram and pick the 
equilibrium wage as the starting point for analysis of a labor law without mentioning one 
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hugely important assumption -- that is, that the labor market is thereby presumed to be at a 
point of full-employment, indicated by an equality between labor demand and labor supply 
(with, in reality, some positive frictional unemployment). This presumption rests, in turn, 
on what is surely the most fundamental proposition in neoclassical economics: the idea that 
competitive markets are self-regulating and flexible prices rise or fall to bring the market 
back to a demand and supply equilibrium (Kniesner and Goldsmith 1987). Mainstream 
economics recognizes as amendments to the theory that many things (―frictions‖) can 
impede and interfere with this process, but nonetheless the assumption is that as a general 
description and central tendency the model of demand and supply and Adam Smith‘s 
invisible hand captures the reality of a market economy (Reder 1982; Lazear 2000). But IE 
explicitly denies both the Invisible Hand theorem and Say‘s Law that underlie this 
conclusion.  
The first part of the IE argument is that involuntary unemployment is the normal or 
―default‖ condition in the aggregate labor market. This means that ordinarily the market 
economy is inside the production possibility frontier because it operates with underutilized 
labor resources. To get to this heterodox conclusion the only necessary change in NE 
assumptions is that economic agents are modeled as behavioral/social beings. The rest 
flows from this as a matter of logic.  
According to competitive theory, persistent involuntary unemployment is a logical 
impossibility, per Reynold‘s statement that ―all unemployment is by choice… it all boils 
down to a question of price‖ (1991, p. 176). IE argues, however, that workers cannot bid 
down wages even if they want because firms – particularly firms in ―primary‖ labor 
markets (high wage, capital and knowledge intensive sectors) -- resist wage cuts.
vi
 The 
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principal reason is the firms know that if they cut wages this also damages employee 
morale and work effort and, hence, they may end up with higher (not lower) labor cost. 
This happens if workers‘ productivity falls more than wage cost. This idea is a central 
lesson of efficiency wage theory (Solow 1990, discussed more below) and has found strong 
confirmation in recent laboratory experiments (Fehr and Falk 1999). Thus, if firms set and 
maintain above-market wages this leads to a semi-chronic condition of excess labor supply 
in the primary labor market – absent, of course, other forms of institutional intervention 
generally decried by NE theorists, such as activist government fiscal/monetary stabilization 
programs perhaps supplemented with an unemployment insurance program and/or 
government funded jobs program. 
If the primary labor market is prone to chronic unemployment and jobs are in short-
supply at high wage firms, it is likely that a portion of the job seekers will shift to the low-
wage secondary sector as they become more desperate for work, thus shifting the labor 
supply curve for low-pay workers rightward and further lowering their wage rate (Bulow 
and Summers 1986). When NE economists draw a demand and supply diagram and start 
the analysis of a labor market regulation at the ―competitive‖ or ―market‖ wage W1, they 
are thus engaging in two kinds of misrepresentation. The first is to assume that in primary 
labor markets there is a demand and supply balance when in fact jobs are rationed and labor 
is in excess supply. The second is to ignore the fact that in secondary labor markets this 
―competitive wage‖ has already been forced to a lower level by the crowding of people 
searching for work due to lack of jobs elsewhere. Again, therefore, we see that the NE labor 
market is the site of disguised unequal bargaining power that forces workers in the guise of 
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freedom of contract to accept lower wages and conditions than would prevail in a truly 
competitive (full employment) labor market.   
But the situation in low-wage labor markets can be much worse than this. 
According to NE theory, the solution to an excess supply of labor (unemployment) is a fall 
in the wage until labor demand and supply are brought into equality. This is why Reynolds 
states that involuntary unemployment is impossible –workers only have to lower their wage 
demand and they can ―buy‖ a job. This is also one reason why NL&E proponents criticize 
social insurance programs (e.g., insurance for unemployment, old age, disability); by giving 
people income when they‘re unemployed, their need to bid down wage rates to get gainful 
employment is alleviated. IE argues, however, that the NE logic is false and that in reality 
the process of wage reduction is likely to not only throw more people into destitution but 
also further worsen the unemployment situation. There are two steps in this argument.  
The first is to show that wage reductions, even in a perfectly competitive economy, 
cannot cure unemployment. This proposition was embraced by Keynes (1936) and is the 
revolutionary part of his message. The reason advanced by Keynes is easily translated into 
institutionalist terms: the price mechanism fails because of a ―missing institution;‖ that is, 
workers can not ―buy‖ a job because the property right they have to trade -- a lower money 
wage -- is not commensurable with the property right employers want for their job 
opportunity -- a lower real wage (Chick 1983). In practical terms, as money wages are bid 
down, product prices soon follow and the real wage may actually increase rather than 
decrease – this is exactly what happened in the Great Depression. We have, therefore, a 
market/Invisible Hand coordination failure, necessitating supplementary or replacement 
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coordination by an organization/Visible Hand, such as the state (Atkinson and Oleson 
1998).    
Given that money wage reductions cannot solve an aggregate unemployment 
problem, IE also goes the next step and demonstrates that wage reductions can actually lead 
to destabilizing/deflationary downward spiral in wages and prices, leading ultimately to 
capitalist catastrophe. They call this process destructive competition, also referred to today 
as a ―race to the bottom‖ (Culbertson 1985; Kaufman 1997). It denies another central NE 
theorem: that ―more competition in markets is always better than less‖ per the contention 
that perfect (unlimited) competition yields the Pareto-efficient outcome. It also opens up 
another avenue for employment regulation to do good rather than harm.     
IE starts again with the notion of ownership and property. In a laissez-faire 
economy lacking any form of protective labor legislation (beyond ordinary contract and tort 
law) or social safety net, the worker‘s only income generating property is his or her labor. 
This asset earns zero, however, unless the worker can obtain a job from an employer. The 
key aspect of labor supply omitted from standard NE theory (e.g., Killingsworth 1983) is 
that workers have ongoing fixed costs of survival, including minimal expenditures for food, 
clothing, health, and housing. For household heads with non-working family members 
(e.g., wife and children), the fixed costs are several times larger. These costs are not to 
satisfy wants, but rather to cover basic human needs, and if unmet the human capital and 
physical selves of the agent and dependents depreciate and eventually perish (Prasch 1995; 
Kaufman 1999a). NE labor supply theory simply ignores fixed subsistence costs and instead 
dwells on the marginal cost of labor (the opportunity cost of giving up extra hour of 
leisure) -- in some cases augmented with a discussion of certain other kinds of fixed costs, 
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such as child care and commuting. More remarkable is the advanced NE literature where, in 
general equilibrium theory of the Arrow-Debreu type, each agent supplying labor is 
assumed to have enough pre-market income to ―ensure his own survival even if he is 
deprived of trade‖ [i.e., remains unemployed] (Geanakoplos 1987, p. 117). How workers 
get this income, if no welfare state exists, is never explained; the practical effect is to 
assume away the starkest reality of capitalism – that if people do not work they have no 
income to cover the fixed costs of survival. 
Having set the stage, we can now watch destructive competition unfold. The first 
event is a significant decline in demand in the aggregate labor market. Workers in both 
primary and secondary labor markets lose their jobs and, with no other assets or 
government support, their income goes to zero. Their fixed costs continue, however, and as 
savings and other forms of support (charity and so on) are used up they become 
increasingly desperate to find work. The only solution, per NE theory, is to try to get work 
by underbidding someone else, or to have other family members enter the labor market. 
The latter effect -- the ―added worker‖ effect -- makes the aggregate labor supply curve 
negatively sloped (Lester 1941; Prasch 2000; Dessing 2004). The reason is that with no 
other source of income support employees cannot exit the labor force as ―discouraged 
workers,‖ unless perhaps to survivalist farming or criminality, leaving the added worker 
effect dominant. Hence, the competition of the unemployed and new labor force entrants 
leads to downward movement of wages and other terms and conditions. In this story, 
Commons noted yet another source of increased labor supply during times of economic 
hardship that adds to the market glut – employed workers, desperate to keep their jobs, 
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voluntarily work harder and also submit to speed-ups, thus allowing firms to further cut 
back on labor (1921, p. 269).  
The NE theory presumes the fall in wage rates will eliminate the excess supply of 
labor and bring back full employment equilibrium, represented by a movement down given 
demand and supply curves until their intersection point. Institutionalists, however, deny this 
proposition. If the aggregate labor supply curve has a more elastic negative slope than the 
aggregate demand curve, which may plausibly be the case in recession/depression (again, 
with out a supportive welfare state), a fall in wages below the original equilibrium level 
will precipitate a destabilizing downward spiral of wages.  
Further, the partial equilibrium flaw in the NE model again comes into play 
(Keynes‘ ―fallacy of composition‖) because NE ignores the negative feedback effect that 
reduced wages have on household income and purchasing power. This problem is 
illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 2.3. For simplicity, I draw the aggregate supply curve as 
upward sloping, per convention. In this diagram, some negative spending shock causes a 
leftward shift of the aggregate labor demand curve, from D1 to D2 (point A to B). At the 
prevailing wage W1 there exists L1-L3 unemployed. To get jobs, they bid down the wage 
and in NE theory full employment is restored when the wage declines to W2 (a movement 
down the demand curve) and D2 equals S1. In Keynesian/IE theory, however, the decline in 
wages has a second effect (Chick 1983) -- it reduces household income and spending and 
leads to a leftward shift of product and labor demand curves, such as to D3 (point C). Thus, 
even with a positive sloped supply curve what develops is the potential for a dynamic non-
equilibrating downward spiral of wages, employment and output (from point A to B to C 
and beyond), akin to a dog chasing its tail. From an IL&E perspective, therefore, 
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employment regulation has a positive role to play by short-circuiting this deflationary spiral 
– in effect keeping the otherwise unstable and unemployment-prone ―free market‖ from 
shifting further inside the production possibility frontier.  
With this scenario in mind, one can quickly appreciate that the New Deal labor 
program, embodied in the SSA, NLRA and FLSA, was conceived and implemented first 
and foremost as a macroeconomic stabilization measure (Mitchell 1986; Linder 1989; 
Kaufman 1996). The minimum wage, collective bargaining, unemployment insurance, old 
age insurance, overtime hours provision and child labor prohibition were intended to 
stabilize the economy and keep it closer to full employment through three channels: first, 
they put a floor under wages and labor conditions in labor markets and thus help short-
circuit the process of deflation and destructive competition; second, they add to household 
income and support spending and aggregate demand; and, third, they create automatic 
stabilizers that reduce cyclical volatility of spending. To an important degree these 
regulatory programs complement Keynesian aggregate demand management and 
weakening them in the name of labor market deregulation (e.g., cutting back 
unemployment insurance) only exacerbates the instability of the economy.  
On the other hand, hallmark IE principles are balance and positive freedom and, 
with these in mind,  proponents of employment regulation must also be careful not to over-
regulate labor markets; likewise, they must recalibrate employment regulation in light of 
evolutionary changes in society and the economy. Most certainly, IL&E is not a one-way 
street to ever greater employment regulation.  
A case in point concerns the role of unemployment. Due to the success of 
Keynesian-inspired countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies (and various structural 
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shifts), post-World War II labor markets have operated closer to full employment. Part of 
the rationale for the full panoply of New Deal labor laws was to protect employment 
conditions from the corrosive effect of the mass unemployment of the 1930s; evidently, this 
same level of protection and regulation may be excessive in the modern era of global 
competition, supply-side growth and closer-to- full employment labor markets. In 
particular, widespread collective bargaining may shift from being (on net) ―monopsony 
reducing‖ to ―monopoly creating,‖ with greater negative effects on productivity, inflation 
and competitiveness (Hirsch 2007; Kaufman 2007d). Yet even here there are countervailing 
arguments typically omitted from the debate. But this thought moves us to the next section.  
  
Efficiency and growth 
 
The third IL&E rationale for employment regulation is that it promotes greater economic 
efficiency and growth. The hallmark of the NE criticism of regulation is that it distorts the 
price system and leads to resource misallocation and economic inefficiency. This is one 
side of the story, and certainly one that IE admits has some truth. But IE points out an 
entirely different and more positive side which NE proponents most often fail to mention. 
That is, for several reasons outlined below employment regulation may not only promote 
efficiency and help keep the economy on the production possibility frontier but also 
encourage the productivity growth that shifts the frontier rightward over time.  
First to consider is another variant of IE‘s ―balance‖ idea. As already noted, the NE 
presumption is that more competition is better than less; the presumption of IE is that 
beyond some level competition becomes excessive and retards efficiency. We have already 
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encountered this idea with the doctrine of destructive competition; here enters a second and 
perhaps even more compelling argument.  
Secure property rights are crucial to the success of a market economy and one of the 
core functions of government in the neoclassical/neoliberal paradigm is to protect and 
enforce these rights. Who will invest in productive enterprise, after all, if one‘s property 
can be easily confiscated without compensation? An insight of IE is that a competitive 
labor market puts the worker exactly in this situation, leading to under-investment in work 
effort and human capital (Commons 1921).  
The neoclassical conception of property in a market exchange context is a 
―commodity,‖ typically some physical/measurable good or service. Perfect competition 
presumes, in turn, that all aspects of a commodity‘s property rights are well-defined and 
priced. In Legal Foundations of Capitalism (1924), Commons describes in considerable 
detail the evolution of the legal conception of property. He describes that a great 
transformation occurred in the late 19
th
 century when the US Supreme Court ruled that 
property is not only the physical item itself (use value) but also the exchange value of the 
item. This distinction arose, among other places, in labor disputes where the Court granted 
firms an injunction against striking employees, not because they were damaging the 
employer‘s physical property but because they damaged the market value of the property 
by keeping away customers and preventing the shipment of goods.  
This expanded notion of property opens up a Pandora‘s Box for neoclassical theory, 
however. Perfectly secure property rights are a cornerstone of the competitive model, but if 
secure property rights are taken to mean legally guaranteed exchange values, then 
prices/wages can never deviate from some original equilibrium level (at least without 
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offsetting compensation). That is, a change in demand and supply leads to a change in the 
value of property and, for the parties who price works against, part of their property is 
―stolen‖ by the market just as much as if a thief trespassed and carried it away. Absolute 
security of property, therefore, can only be attained by rigidly fixed prices, no doubt much 
to the harm of allocative efficiency.  
On the other hand, if property rights are taken to mean only secure use values, then 
large changes in demand and supply and market price can dramatically alter the exchange 
value of property. NE labels this a ―pecuniary externality,‖ but concludes it does not 
interfere with attainment of efficiency (Cornes and Sandler 1996). IE suggests, however, 
that pecuniary externalities, and more generally the much-touted ―flexibility‖ of 
competitive markets, may actually reduce efficiency in an economy of real people. This 
proposition rests on the observation that competitive markets (in any real form) create large 
amounts of insecurity for economic agents and hence, beyond some interior point, greater 
insecurity makes workers less productive (an inverse U relationship). There are two reasons 
for this.  
First, employment insecurity -- the opposite of entitlement -- up to some point is a 
positive/constructive source of motivation that causes people to work hard and do what is 
best for the long-run interests of the firm; beyond some point, however, greater insecurity 
reduces work motivation and performance by creating dysfunctional levels of stress, 
impaired decision-making and attention (bounded rationality), constant job search and 
unduly short time horizons (Polanyi 1944; Kaufman 1999b).
vii
  
Second, it is widely recognized that workers perceive they develop a stronger 
property right in their jobs as they accumulate additional years of tenure with the firm 
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(―sweat equity‖), even though of course the courts and legislatures have generally refused 
to legally recognize such a right (Fogel 1982). When firms cut wages and benefits or lay-
off people, as would routinely happen in a competitive market, workers instinctively regard 
this as tantamount to theft of part of their property right in the job, leading them to 
react/retaliate in a variety of ways that erode efficiency (Perlman 1928; Polanyi 1944). 
Examples include reduced work effort, greater absenteeism and calling in the union 
organizer. Thus, measures that reduce excessive wage/employment insecurity -- without 
going to the other extreme of a completely rigid wage/employment system -- promote 
efficiency. This idea is one of the foundation stones for the modern welfare state and labor 
law is the vehicle for implementing it (Moss 1996).  
Much the same idea applies to investment in human capital. An NE indictment of 
any form of labor market regulation that puts a floor on wages is that it reduces firms‘ 
willingness to provide general on-the-job training since workers can no longer offer to 
work for a lower wage to compensate firms for the cost of the training. But, as in all these 
matters, there is another side to the story (Acemoglu and Pischke 1999). Rarely asked are 
the following questions: Will firms invest in specific job training? Will such training be 
attractive to workers if the value of this asset is at great risk from lay-offs due to shifts in 
demand and supply in laissez-faire labor markets? Probably not, just as Galbraith (1967) 
argues that firms are unwilling to invest billions needed to finance new products and plants 
without stable market conditions. The same logic applies to investment in internal labor 
markets and progressive human resource management practices, even though both may be 
profitable over the long-run and quite socially desirable. We again see that the optimal level 
of market competition is not the maximum but some intermediate point, leading to the 
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heretical conclusion that a market economy with some degree of imperfect competition and 
employment regulation will outperform its competitive/laissez-faire rival. 
Labor market regulation and mandates may promote greater efficiency and growth 
through several other channels. All involve some aspect of human agency and incomplete 
contracts. 
A well-known example is through efficiency wages, a modern development but one 
that goes back to Adam Smith (Smith 1776/1937, p. 81; Akerlof and Yellen 1990; Solow 
1990). A key assumption of standard microeconomic price theory is that the worker‘s 
marginal product (increment to output) is independent of the wage rate. This is assured by 
modeling labor as an inanimate commodity so the marginal product is a technologically 
determined datum. An increase in the wage in a competitive market from a union or 
minimum wage law unambiguously moves firms up their labor demand curves and reduces 
employment. But if labor is embodied in human beings, and positive transaction cost 
creates incomplete contracts, then a higher wage may lead to an offsetting increase in the 
marginal product to the extent it elicits more labor supply (work effort, on-time attendance, 
etc.) from employees (Ippolito 2003). This result may occur on a variety of grounds, such 
as fairness or fear of termination. Whatever the case, over a modest range it is quite 
possible that the effective labor demand curve is vertical or even positive, implying that an 
employment regulation may create no dis-employment effect or efficiency loss (Perlman 
1969, p. 50-55).    
A similar conclusion concerns the IE ―shock effect‖ argument. Instititutionalist 
Sumner Slichter (1931) argued that collective bargaining and minimum wages might not 
produce a negative employment effect because the increase in labor cost motivates (shocks) 
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management into tightening up on other elements of cost in order to maintain profitability. 
NE economists (e.g., Stigler 1976) dismiss this argument as ad hoc or lacking empirical 
evidence. IE, however, provides a logical account for the shock effect. Assuming economic 
agents are human beings, this leads to bounded rationality, positive transaction cost and 
volitional effort supply. The first casualty is the NE hypothesis of cost minimization/profit 
maximization. Positive transaction cost and incomplete contracts opens the door for the 
principle-agent problem in firms. The interest of the owners is maximum profit, but the 
interest of the salaried managers is their own utility maximization – a function of firm 
profits (required to keep their jobs) but also other things that decrease profit, such as sky-
high executive salaries and growth for growth‘s sake (e.g., through mergers and 
acquisitions). Institutionalists, such as Berle and Means (1932), have labeled this the 
―separation of ownership and control‖ and note that it can lead to ―satisficing‖ behavior 
with regard to cost and profits (Simon 1982; Kaufman 1999b, Altman 2001). Satisficing 
behavior, in conjunction with a minimum necessary level of profits, leads management to 
tolerate organizational slack, above-minimum costs and in general some degree of 
inefficiency. A rise in labor cost from a labor law or mandate does not, therefore, 
necessarily translate into any decrease in employment, since the managers may well be able 
to find equivalent cost savings in other areas, including their own effort supply and multi-
million dollar compensation.  
A third efficiency-enhancing channel deserving mention is that employment 
regulation not only protects workers but also protects ―high road‖ employers who make 
long-term investments in human capital, physical capital and R&D. Research shows that 
productivity is higher at firms using a ―high performance work system‖ (HPWS) composed 
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of self-managed work teams, job security provisions, extensive training, employee 
involvement methods, and formal dispute resolution programs (Black and Lynch 2001). An 
HPWS requires, however, large upfront investment cost, just as does building new state-of-
the-art plants or conducting leading-edge R&D. These kinds of investments are crucial for 
long run growth but may be seriously impeded by the instability and hyper short-term 
competition found in competitive markets (Cappelli, et. al., 1997). Employment regulation 
can protect and encourage new forms of work organization, such as HPWS, by putting a 
floor under competition so firms skimping on wages and labor conditions cannot gain an 
undue competitive edge and drive these firms out of business.  
Last but not least, we come to the link between efficiency and fairness. This link 
was already touched upon with regard to efficiency wages but has a much broader and 
compelling role to play. An implication of the NE fundamental welfare theorems is that 
attainment of Pareto efficiency in a competitive economy is independent of fairness in 
endowments and outcomes (Stiglitz 2000). IE denies this proposition at both a micro and 
macro level.  
At a micro level, commodities do not care if they receive a high or low price and 
have no conception of fair treatment. People do, however. Research in behavioral and 
experimental economics systematically shows that when procedural and distributive norms 
of fairness in the workplace are violated workers retaliate by reducing work effort, 
cooperation and organizational citizenship behavior, thus exacting a reciprocal ―price‖ in 
the form of reduced profit and efficiency (Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Schmid 2004).  
At a macro level, fairness also promotes efficiency and growth (Kitson, Martin and 
Wilkinson 2000). Societies that have a more balanced income distribution (at least up to a 
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point) show higher growth rates (Gobben, Rayp and Van de Gaer 2007). A reason is that 
when all parts of a society feel they are sharing equitably in the fruits of productive 
enterprise they also feel more committed to and respectful of the enterprise. This sense of 
shared gain and social solidarity helps maintain and expand both a firm‘s and nation‘s 
single most productive asset – a cohesive, cooperative and lawful institutional order. 
Without such an institutional order, and the sense of inclusion and fair treatment it rests on, 
organizations and societies fall into the non-cooperative trap of the Prisoner‘s Dilemma 
game (Miller 1991). Labor market regulation and employment mandates are one solution to 
maintaining cooperation and social justice -- and avoiding industrial conflict and 
adversarial employment relations.  
 
Externalities and social costs of labor 
 
We now come to the fourth rationale advanced by IE economists for labor market 
regulation and employment mandates – labor market externalities and social costs of labor. 
As earlier indicated, NE recognizes that externalities provide a public interest rationale for 
employment regulation; the difference between NE and IE on this matter is, therefore, over 
the extent and severity of externalities. In particular, IE maintains externalities are more 
widespread and severe than NE generally assumes.  
An externality arises any time one or more dimensions of a good or service are not 
fully covered in a complete contract, thus allowing part of the benefits or costs to ―leak-
out‖ and affect third parties.  When this happens, there develops a divergence between the 
private benefit/cost realized by the buyer and seller and the social (or total) benefit/cost 
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realized by the buyer, seller and all affected third parties (Addison and Hirsch 1997). Since 
buyers and sellers make decisions based on private benefits/costs, this divergence 
necessarily leads to incorrect decisions, false price signals in the market, and economic 
inefficiency from misallocated resources and inequity from misplaced or unanticipated 
gains/losses in exchange.  
Although externalities affect both sides in the labor market, the ILE presumption is 
that they have a greater adverse impact on workers. In particular, for reasons described 
below employers can often shift private production cost on to workers, their families and 
other third parties as a form of social cost (Blum 1956; Stabile 1993a, 1993b; Prasch 2005). 
The extent of this ―social cost‖ becomes even larger when the notion of property rights is 
extended from commercial goods and services to fundamental human and social rights at 
work, given that these rights (e.g., freedom of speech and association) have no market price 
and therefore are not factored into firms‘ production plans and human resource practices 
(Sunstein 2004; Deakin and Wilkinson 2005). A function of employment regulation, 
therefore, is to prevent this cost shifting or provide injured parties with compensation for it.  
To demonstrate, I give examples of how several different forms of employment 
regulation may help solve a social cost problem, including a legislated minimum wage, 
universal health insurance, and a wage subsidy.   
A serious gap in NE labor supply theory, as already noted, is the focus on marginal 
cost and neglect of most elements of fixed cost, particularly individual and family 
subsistence. However, in the classical economics that preceded NE labor‘s subsistence 
wage was a central focus of attention. Adam Smith noted, for example, that ―A man must 
always live by his work, and his wages must be at least sufficient to maintain him‖ 
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(1776/1937, p. 67). This insight was later developed by the Sidney and Beatrice Webb and 
John M. Clark into a social rationale a ―national minimum‖ in terms of wages, earnings and 
benefits (Webb and Webb 1897; Clark 1923). The idea is explained by Sidney Webb:  
 
The continued efficiency of a nation‘s industry obviously depends on the 
continuance of its citizens in health and strength. For an industry to be self-
supporting, it must, therefore, maintain its full establishment of workers unimpaired 
in numbers and vigor, [and] with a sufficient number of children to fill all vacancies 
caused by death or superannuation. If the employers in a particular trade are able to 
take such advantage of the necessities of their workpeople as to hire them for wages 
actually insufficient to provide enough food, clothing, and shelter to maintain them 
permanently in average health; if they are able to work them for hours so long as to 
deprive them of adequate rest and recreation; or if the can subject them to 
conditions so dangerous or insanitary as positively to shorten their lives, that trade is 
clearly obtaining a supply of labor force which it does not pay for... he [the 
employer] is clearly receiving a subsidy or bounty …[and is] economically parasitic 
(1912, p. 986, 987). 
 
 
The idea is that the wage paid workers must cover not only the opportunity cost of 
leisure but also the maintenance and depreciation of their human capital, otherwise private 
production cost understates social production cost. This means that the wage must cover 
items such as minimal necessary health expenditure, minimal retirement income, minimal 
income support during periods of unemployment, and minimal income for dependent 
children (so the nation has a future workforce). Firms, however, may be able, because of 
market imperfections and incomplete contracts, to partially or completely avoid paying 
these costs, which in effect also shields consumers from these costs through higher product 
prices. Instead, the costs are shifted to the workers themselves, their families, local 
communities, or the nation at large. For example, firms with market power may be able to 
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obtain employees and yet not pay health insurance, while other firms may opportunistically 
renege on pension payments by firing workers when they get closer to retirement age. 
Consumers and firms are, in Webb‘s term, ―parasitic‖ in that they enjoy lower prices and 
more material abundance at workers‘ expense – particularly the expense of low-wage 
workers who often work in unsafe jobs, have the least financial ability to withstand ill-
health, and have the least income for and accessibility to alternative suppliers of health 
care.     
A shifting of social labor cost is also facilitated by a second factor. This is a large 
supply of labor in the market. Even in a perfectly competitive labor market, the wage may 
not cover the subsistence cost of labor. For example, a huge number of firms will flood the 
market with product, cause the price to fall until enough firms ―die,‖ which constricts 
supply and restores profit to a normal (―subsistence‖) level. The same process works in 
labor markets. Assume, for example, large scale immigration into the nation. To balance 
supply and demand, the wage may have to fall so far that it does not cover the minimum 
subsistence costs of labor. The parallel market solution is that some workers need to ―go 
out of business‖ so that the labor supply shrinks until wages again cover minimum fixed 
and variable labor cost. This process may happen in a variety of ways: for example, 
workers may withdraw from the labor market and maintain themselves through crime or in 
the underground economy; they may become homeless and beg for food and live in 
community shelters; or they may go out of business through sickness and starvation – as 
millions of workers and their families do in various parts of the world today. Of course, if 
workers had a legal/human right to the social wage the externality/social cost problem 
would disappear. Commons proposed exactly this a century ago – a legislated ―right to 
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work‖ guarantee or equivalent amount of income -- but was denounced as a proto-Socialist 
(Kaufman 2003). It is, however, the logical step to making the competitive labor market 
even more ―perfect‖ by filling in a missing property right and eliminating an externality 
(Standing, 2004). Absent this step, a distinctly second-best – but better than nothing – 
solution is a minimum wage, earned income tax credit, or collective bargaining. 
Firms may also shift labor costs in a variety of other ways. A classic example is 
costs of workplace injury and illness (Burton and Chelius 1997). Production inherently 
involves a risk for workers of injury, illness and sometimes death. In theory, these costs are 
part of production cost and should be fully borne by the firm and then, ultimately, by 
consumers in the form of higher product prices. In a perfect labor market, the costs of 
accident and illness are fully incorporated into higher wages (as a compensating 
differential) and are thus passed through to firms and consumers; in an imperfect labor 
market, however, firms (and hence consumers) can successfully shift these costs to others. 
For example, if labor markets have involuntary unemployment then firms face an excess 
supply of labor and may not have to pay compensating wage differentials; alternatively, 
firms with labor market power may underpay employees partly by under-investing in 
workplace safety and health practices. A workmen‘s compensation law, therefore, by 
imposing an injury tax on firms may move the labor market closer to a competitive 
equilibrium by making private cost come closer to social cost. Similar considerations may 
affect other health issues for employees, such as maternity leave, and here some form of 
mandate could also accomplish the same end.  
These arguments are demonstrated in panel (c) of Figure 2.3. When NE economists 
analyze the economic effects of a labor law, they draw a diagram with the demand and 
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supply lines, D1 and S1, and label W1 the ―competitive‖ wage (point A). But in doing so 
they omit from the diagram one crucial consideration: The social wage that covers the full 
cost of the labor input, including dependent family members if labor is to reproduce itself. 
The social wage, assumed here to be W2, may be above, equal to, or below the prevailing 
market wage; the exact relationship is ultimately an empirical issue. I assume here, for 
purposes of exposition, that the market wage is below the social wage. 
We may call the market wage W1 a pseudo competitive wage – pseudo because, 
first, it is an illusion obtained only by omitting consideration of the full social cost of labour 
and, second, because it purports to yield an efficient resource allocation when in fact it 
yields an inefficient allocation (as with any externality). In panel (c), the difference W2-W1 
represents the per unit social tax on labour and social subsidy to capital and consumers.  
Given this market failure, Coase (1960: 18) argues, ―the problem is one of choosing 
the appropriate social arrangements for dealing with harmful effects.‖ A variety of 
alternatives are available. Consider, first, a legally mandated minimum wage. The idea is to 
set the minimum wage at the level of the social wage W2, thus creating a wage floor that 
(just) covers labour‘s minimum fixed and variable cost. The wage floor is depicted in panel 
(c) of Figure 1 by the solid horizontal line at W2. To the degree social wages vary across 
workforce groups (e.g., men and women), a better but more administratively difficult 
approach is to set different wage floors.  
Special notice should be given in this situation to the employment and 
unemployment effects of labor law. In reaction to the imposition of the wage floor W2, 
employment declines from L1 to L2 (point A to B) -- exactly the negative employment 
effect the critics of minimum wage laws highlight. But note that this employment decline, 
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as judged by the theory of orthodox economics, should be welcomed because it eliminates 
inefficient use of the nation‘s labor resources caused by a market imperfection (an 
externality). Critics, nonetheless, may assert it is socially misguided to destroy these L1-L2 
jobs when they are held by low-wage workers who presumably need them and, further, 
voluntarily accepted them. After all, don‘t all sides gain from trade? The answer is ―no‖: 
On efficiency grounds these outcomes are harmful to both workers and society if the 
market wage is less than the social wage, while on normative grounds they represent 
retrogression to inhumane labor conditions that advanced societies have long ago 
repudiated. Similarly, in reaction to the minimum wage unemployment increases to L3-L2 
amount (point C to B), but this is a social virtue to the extent making work more rewarding 
draws in L3-L1 new job seekers who were otherwise supporting themselves by crime or 
activities in the underground economy.  
The social cost problem outlined above may be solved by a minimum wage law or a 
wage increase bargained by a trade union. But better solutions may also be available. One 
is to directly eliminate the social cost problem, say through universal health insurance. A 
second is to shift the labor demand curve to the right through some type of wage or job 
subsidy to employers (thus closing the social cost gap but increasing employment). Yet a 
third is an income supplement for workers, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit program.  
A central tenet of IL&E is that free labour markets – despite their many admitted 
virtues – will lead to numerous instances of inefficiency, injustice, and shortfalls in human 
wellbeing. The social cost problem is one example. The social cost problem also illustrates 
another feature of IL&E – a dedication to finding pragmatic, workable solutions to 
employment problems in the here and now.  If the superior solution (e.g., universal health 
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care) is not readily attainable, then IL&E proponents believe a second-best solution (e.g., a 
minimum wage) is preferable to no policy at all. Commons‘ student John Fitch well 
summarizes the IL&E philosophy on this matter: ―It is not legislation as such we desire, but 
social advance‖ (1927, p.243).     
 
Conclusion 
The theme of this chapter is that there are (at least) two sides to every debate and the debate 
over the pros and cons of employment regulation is no exception. In this spirit, I have 
endeavored to present in a fair and balanced way both sides to the employment regulation 
debate -- the ―anti-regulation‖ NL&E movement and the ―pro-regulation‖ IL&E movement. 
These labels, of course, are generalizations that hide a wide spectrum of individual opinion 
and, as I have hopefully depicted, both sides capture important elements of truth. 
The ―bottom line‖ conclusion from this analysis is that whether one tends toward a 
NL&E or IL&E perspective turns on several fundamental considerations. One is the 
competitive nature of labor markets and, in particular, the degree to which they locate 
toward the highly competitive versus highly non-competitive pole; a second is the way 
firms are modeled (production functions or governance systems); a third is the relative 
weight given to different interests in society (e.g., consumers‘ versus workers‘ interests); a 
fourth is the degree to which labor is treated as one of N exchangeable commodities versus 
a unique ―human factor‖ endowed with certain inalienable rights; and a fifth is the social, 
cultural and historical background that conditions each person‘s viewpoint (preferences) on 
these matters.  
  
73 
 
Seen in this light, there is no single right answer to the question ―what is the optimal 
amount of employment regulation?‖ since the answer is crucially contingent on these 
assumptions and how they are specified in theoretical models. In the end, theory can guide 
the discussion and inform our priors but the final verdict inevitably rests on the weight of 
empirical evidence and each person‘s normative judgment about whose interests are to 
count and the type of world we want to live in. Not even appeal to efficiency can reveal a 
value free and determinate outcome, given that efficiency itself cannot be calculated until 
we specify whose preferences (interests) are being maximized – the antecedent issue that 
lies at the very heart of law and politics.  
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Diagrams 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. NL&E Perspective: Economic Effects of Labor Market Regulation 
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Figure 2.2. NL&E Perspective: Economic Effects of an Employment Mandate 
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Figure 2.3. IL&E Perspective: Economic Effects of Labor Market Regulation 
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i
 The same may apply to new labor force entrants. 
ii
 See Summers 1989 and Addison and Hirsch 1997 for more information. 
iii
 Note that a direct change in the wage rate, such as by a minimum wage law, causes a movement along the 
demand curve, a change in some other variable affecting employment, such as the cost of a mandate, causes a 
shift. 
iv
 The same applies to trade unions. 
v
 Firms may still own a large capital stock but rent out portions to workers now-turned independent 
contractors. 
vi
 Firms in ―secondary‘ labor markets may cut wages, however, since the employment relation is more short 
term and labor is more like a commodity.   
vii
 Consider, for example, the research productivity of professors starting from 0 tenure protection to 100 
percent. 
 
